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Abstract 
 
 The phenomenon of anthropogenic climate change requires immediate attention. 
Many of the most severe effects of climate change will occur in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Least-developed countries (LDCs) in this region are particularly vulnerable to climate 
change, due to their geographical location and their poor ability to cope with the 
consequences. This study examines the various impacts, vulnerabilities, and adaptation 
strategies associated with climate change in sub-Saharan African LDCs, using Tanzania, 
Burkina Faso, and Senegal as case studies. Each of these three countries has developed a 
National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA), a country-specific climate change 
adaptation plan designed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. A number of theories on adaptation emphasize the importance of having the 
capacity to adapt. Interestingly, the NAPAs do not include capacity-building in their 
prioritized lists of adaptation strategies. I hypothesize that this omission can be attributed 
in part to the countries’ adaptation priorities and to the countries’ low levels of extant 
capacity. It may be the desire of the LDCs to create technology-based adaptation plans 
that can be implemented by even their most vulnerable groups, namely poor rural 
populations. Furthermore, colonial legacies and low levels of development have, in some 
cases, compromised the capacity of governments to carry out the most basic and 
immediate tasks. Building the capacity to respond to climate change is not always 
possible for the governments of LDCs.  
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 4 
I. Introduction 
 
The world’s scientists and state leaders have finally reached a consensus that  
anthropogenic climate change is a reality and that the phenomenon requires immediate 
attention.1 While climate-altering gases mix uniformly in the atmosphere regardless of 
the distribution of emission sources, the impacts of climate change will be far-reaching 
and unequal in distribution. Future generations of all socio-economic and income levels 
will feel the effects of climate change, even if greenhouse gas emissions were to be 
completely cut off today, since substances such as carbon dioxide remain in the 
atmosphere for an entire century.2 Currently, the atmosphere’s greenhouse gas 
concentrations have exceeded the Earth’s natural range of the last 650,000 years.3 
Scientists believe that a temperature rise of 2°C represents a threshold above which 
further temperature increases would have catastrophic consequences.4 Therefore, despite 
uncertainties regarding the exact magnitude and timing of the impacts, it is imperative 
that the world address climate change immediately. The globe’s poorest populations are 
already beginning to suffer from the effects of climate change. However, the countries 
that suffer the most are also the least responsible for anthropogenic climate change, and 
are the least able to cope with its impacts.  
Poor countries are the most heavily affected by climate change and have the least 
capacity to adapt. Least-developed countries (LDCs) have the world’s smallest 
greenhouse gas emissions and thus have contributed the least to the climate change 
                                                 
1
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report 
2
 Human Development Report 2007/2008 Summary, p. 3 
3
 Human Development Report 2007/2008 Summary, p. 9 
4
 Human Development Report 2007/2008 Summary 
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phenomenon.5 Ironically, the developed world – the advanced industrialized countries 
with the greatest responsibility for causing anthropogenic climate change in the first place 
– will not suffer nearly as much from climate change as LDCs and, additionally, have a 
much greater ability to cope with the negative impacts. The developed world is therefore 
in the position to assist LDCs in their adaptation endeavors, even if it is reluctant to do 
so, and it is important that special attention be given to the plight of LDCs.  
In this thesis, I investigate the principal climate change adaptation strategies of 
LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa. I selected Africa as my area of study for two reasons: first 
of all, the effects of climate change will be particularly severe in this part of the world. 
Secondly, a great number of African countries are extremely poor and thus will face 
particular difficulties in coping with climate change’s impacts. In response to the 
especially vulnerable situation of LDCs, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change has designed country-specific adaptation strategies, entitled National 
Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs). However, capacity-building, and important 
component of effective adaptation to climate change, appears to be missing from the 
NAPAs’ prioritized adaptation strategies. I seek to explain the lack of capacity-building 
plans, using Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Senegal as case studies. I will argue that 
capacity-building is missing from the NAPAs because of the countries’ low levels of 
existing capacity, and because of the countries’ colonial legacies. I first will provide a 
background on climate-related vulnerabilities and the impacts of climate change on sub-
                                                 
5
 LDCs are a category of countries officially recognized by the United Nations and a number of other 
international bodies. The three major components of the definition of and LDC are low income, weak 
human resources, and economic vulnerability. UNFCCC website, “Frequently Asked Questions about 
LDCs, NAPAs, and the LEG.” 
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/least_developed_countries_portal/frequently_asked_questions/ite
ms/4743.php>. 
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Saharan Africa. I will also describe the rationale behind the NAPAs. At the end of this 
chapter, I will lay out the structure of my study.  
Vulnerabilities 
The continent of Africa is particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of climate 
change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states this with high 
confidence in its Fourth Assessment Report, adding that the climate situation in this 
region is “aggravated by the interaction of ‘multiple stresses’… and low adaptive 
capacity.”6 According to both the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and the IPCC, vulnerability is “the degree to which a system is susceptible to, 
and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability 
and extremes.”7 The distinction between “weather” and “climate” is also relevant: 
Weather is the phenomena of wind, rain, sunshine, clouds, and temperature on a day-to-
day basis. Climate refers to the overall or average weather conditions that prevail over the 
longer term.8  
Africa’s primary climate-related vulnerabilities stem from the negative impacts of 
climate change on agriculture and food security, water stress, ecosystem degradation, 
health risks, and weak adaptive capacity. With high confidence, the IPCC claims that 
adaptation strategies implemented by African farmers are insufficient in terms of 
responding to future climate change, and that “agricultural production and food 
security… are likely to be severely compromised.”9 Many African countries depend 
heavily on agriculture for local livelihoods and national GDP. The agricultural sector 
                                                 
6
 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, p. 435 
7
 IPCC Working Group II Glossary, <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/glossary/ar4-wg2.pdf>.  
8
 Basher et al., in Climate Change in Africa, p. 273 
9
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 435 
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comprises between 10% and 70% of the GDP of African countries.10 The Saharan region 
of Africa could experience “agricultural losses of between 2 and 7% of GDP” by 2100.11 
Many areas in Africa already experience agricultural challenges due to semi-arid 
conditions, and climate change is projected to render marginal agricultural regions 
unsuitable for cultivation.12 Prolonged droughts and floods, often attributed to climate 
change, intensify other challenges to agriculture such as crop diseases, poor soil fertility, 
and pests.13 Furthermore, it is likely that the changing climate will decrease the duration 
of growing seasons. In certain countries, crop yields are expected to decline up to 50% in 
the next twelve years.14 Small-scale farmers will be particularly negatively impacted, 
with net revenues from crops falling up to 90% over the next century.15 Overall, food 
security in Africa will be threatened and more Africans will suffer from hunger and 
famine.  
Water shortages are one of the major ways in which climate change negatively 
affects human livelihood. The IPCC predicts with very high confidence that climate 
change will exacerbate water stress in areas already prone to water shortages, and will 
place a number of countries at risk of water stress even though they might not currently 
face water issues.16 Roughly 200 million people, approximately one-quarter of Africa’s 
population, already experience high water stress. This number could potentially double 
by the 2020s and triple by the 2050s.17 Alterations in rainfall patterns, attributed to 
climate change, can often lead to drought – a significant problem for Africans, since over 
                                                 
10
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report,  p. 439 
11
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 447 
12
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 435 
13
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 439 
14
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 435 
15
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 435 
16
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 435 
17
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 435 
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a third of Africa’s population dwells in “drought-prone areas.”18 Reduced agricultural 
productivity and increased susceptibility to diseases are two primary effects of drought. 
The Sahel region already experiences persistent drought, and thus is particularly 
vulnerable to further water shortages induced by climate change.19 “Drought affected 
areas in sub-Saharan Africa could expand by 60-90 million hectares, with dry land zones 
suffering losses of US$26 billion by 2060.”20 The African Sahel is especially at risk to 
desertification, a climate process also influenced by rainfall patterns. The Sahelian 
ecological zone actually shifted southward by roughly 30 km as a result of reduced 
rainfall in the latter part of the 20th century.21 The southward spread of the desert 
destroyed grassland areas as well as some flora and fauna.22 
Climate change can cause significant ecosystem degradation, which negatively 
affects the livelihoods of many Africans. With very high confidence, the IPCC reports 
that noticeable changes are already occurring in an array of African ecosystems, “at a 
faster rate than anticipated.”23 In most of Africa’s sub-Saharan countries, wood and 
charcoal provide approximately 80 to 90% of the energy consumed by poor households.24 
“Extreme poverty and the lack of access to other fuels mean that 80% of the overall 
African population relies primarily on biomass to meet its residential needs, with this fuel 
source supplying more than 80% of the energy consumed in sub-Saharan Africa.”25 This 
heavy dependence on biomass adds to Africa’s vulnerability to ecosystem degradation. 
Moreover, a reliance on wood-based energy sources encourages deforestation, which 
                                                 
18
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 437 
19
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 439 
20
 Human Development Report 2007/2008, p. 18 
21
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 439 
22
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 439 
23
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 435 
24
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 442 
25
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 442 
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accelerates the degradation caused by climate change. Mountain ecosystems, notably Mt. 
Kilimanjaro, are also undergoing modifications largely as a result of climate change. Mt. 
Kilimanjaro’s ice cap may vanish for the first time in 11,000 years within the next two 
decades.26 Disappearing ice caps will reduce water availability to neighboring 
communities.  
While some areas in Africa will experience severe water shortages as a result of 
climate change, other regions will become increasingly endangered by flooding. With 
high confidence, the IPCC predicts the inundation of coastal lands.27 Lakes and rivers 
will be impacted as climate change alters rainfall patterns. Both freshwater floods and sea 
water inundation compromise sanitation and the availability of potable water.28 Changes 
in marine ecosystems will also contribute to the vulnerability of many African countries 
to climate change. “In Africa, highly productive ecosystems (mangroves, estuaries, 
deltas, coral reefs), which form the basis for important economic activities such as 
tourism and fisheries, are located in the coastal zone.”29 Coastal cities contain 40% of 
West Africa’s population.30 Damage to coral reefs, for instance, as a consequence of 
increased temperatures and acidification of the ocean, could reduce the fish supply. Fish 
are a vital source of food and revenue for many coastal African countries: for example, 
over 6% of Senegal’s GDP comes from fisheries.31 Ecosystems such as mangroves 
protect against erosion, indicating that the degradation of marine ecosystems could 
                                                 
26
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 449 
27
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 435 
28
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 437 
29
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 450 
30
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 450 
31
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 448 
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increase vulnerability to sea-level rise. Rising sea levels may also contribute to flooding, 
which negatively impacts human health. 
Climate change has significant implications for the health of populations in 
African countries, as the IPCC states with high confidence.32 Climate change is believed 
to “alter the ecology of some disease vectors in Africa, and consequently the spatial and 
temporal transmission of such diseases.”33 Malaria already kills 1 million people per year, 
and climate change could cause an additional 220-400 million people to be exposed to the 
disease.34 The increased scope of malaria is often ascribed to the warming of 
temperatures and changes in rainfall. Health stresses are not limited to disease exposure, 
however; limited food supply and poor nutrition increase human vulnerability as well. 
Furthermore, poor health in the present generation could have implications for 
development in the future.35 Many poor countries lack the capacity to respond and adapt 
to these climate-related threats.  
Capacities 
Africa’s vulnerability to climate change is compounded by the weak adaptive 
capacities of its countries. The continent’s low level of development restricts its capacity 
to respond to the effects of a changing climate. Studies have shown that “sub-Saharan 
Africa is the only region in the world that has become poorer in this generation.”36 This 
poverty can in part be explained by diminishing food security, decreasing real wealth, 
lack of economic growth, poor education, and the spread of HIV/AIDS.37 Public services, 
                                                 
32
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 435 
33
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 435 
34
 Human Development Report 2007/2008, p. 19 
35
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 437 
36
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 440 
37
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 440 
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such as healthcare or response to an environmental disaster, often are impeded by poorly 
designed and implemented policies.38 Many institutional and legal frameworks in African 
countries are inadequate for addressing climate challenges such as ecosystem 
degradation, droughts, and floods. Lack of access to technology, infrastructure, 
information, and markets also create barriers to adaptation.39 For example, “Africa has 
been described as the world’s great laggard in technological advance in the area of 
agriculture,” and consequently many countries experience heightened climate change 
vulnerability due to inefficient irrigation technologies.40 Environmental degradation and 
climate vulnerability are intensified by poor infrastructure and limited technology, as well 
as a dependence on natural resource extraction for energy, shelter, clean water, and 
food.41 African LDCs struggle to respond to climate-related vulnerabilities. 
In order for countries to adapt to the effects of climate change, they must have the 
capacity to do so. Adaptation involves both responding to the negative impacts of climate 
change and adjusting accordingly. In this context, responding implies acknowledging the 
effects of climatic change, whereas adjusting consists of making changes in order to cope 
with the climatic changes. A country’s capacity is its ability or potential to generate a 
response and make the necessary adjustments.42 Studies suggest that institutions, 
knowledge, and technology are significant components of the capacity to adapt. 
Knowledge and understanding of climate vulnerabilities are required in order to plan an 
effective adaptation strategy. Technology enables policy-makers to gather sufficient 
information about a problem, and also forms the basis of many adaptation plans. 
                                                 
38
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 441 
39
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 441 
40
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 441 
41
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 441 
42
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 727  
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Institutions, at both the international and domestic levels, play a significant role in 
generating and implementing adaptation policies. In this study, I use the term “capacity” 
to refer to state capacity. State capacity has technical, intellectual, participatory, 
administrative, and political components. Technical and intellectual capacities are 
required for identifying adaptation needs and developing appropriate policy responses. 
Participatory capacity is important in order for stakeholders to have a voice in the 
decision-making process; and administrative or political capacity is necessary for the 
implementation of adaptation strategies.  
Effective adaptation to climate change is necessary even with the implementation 
of strict climate change mitigation measures. Greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere 
for a century; thus, the world has committed itself to the consequences of climate change 
well into the future. As demonstrated, poor African countries will be the hardest hit by 
climate change’s impacts. African LDCs suffer from an array of climate-related 
vulnerabilities and lack the capacity to adapt – in fact, many even lack the capacity 
required to generate an effective adaptation plan. Therefore, the international community 
must provide assistance in the adaptation arena.43 While rich countries have been 
reluctant to cut down on fossil fuel consumption, the world’s wealthiest have begun to 
perceive that adapting to climate change is a necessity. Since the wealthy nations have 
the means to adapt, they are able to provide adaptive aid to those with “far more severe 
adaptation challenges.”44 One way in which the developed world has responded to the 
plight of LDCs is by facilitating climate change adaptation plans.  
 
                                                 
43
 Human Development Report 2007/2008, p. 4 
44
 Human Development Report 2007/2008, p. 24 
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National Adaptation Programs of Action 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in 
effect since March of 1994, has addressed the adaptation needs of LDCs by developing 
an agenda for National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs).45 According to the 
UNFCCC, the entire “rationale for developing NAPAs rests on the low adaptive capacity 
of LDCs”46 These country-specific documents, developed by LDCs with guidance from 
the UNFCCC, are designed to facilitate immediate adaptation to the countries’ most 
urgent climate-related vulnerabilities.47 In Article 4 of the Convention, the UNFCCC 
officially recognizes the “specific needs and special situations” of LDCs in terms of 
adapting to climate change.48 In the 7th Conference of Parties (COP), the UNFCCC 
acknowledged that LDCs lack the capacity to adapt, as a result of vulnerability, 
widespread poverty, and poor human, infrastructural, and economic conditions.49 
Therefore, a number of international actors must provide adaptation assistance. The 
UNFCCC placed the Global Environment Facility (GEF)50 in charge of activities such as 
improving data collection, analysis, and dissemination, providing specialized technical 
training, establishing and strengthening research centers, supporting climate change 
education, promoting technology transfers, and enhancing capacity.51 A climate change 
                                                 
45
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change website, “Essential Background” 
46
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
28/CP.7, p. 8 
47
 IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 731 
48
 UNFCCC website, “Essential Background,” 4.9 
49
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its tenth session, 
Decision 5/CP.7, p. 33 
50
 The GEF is an international partnership of countries, institutions, and non-governmental organizations, 
designed to “address global environmental issues while supporting national sustainable development 
initiatives.” The GEF offers grants and also acts as “the designated financial mechanism for a number of 
multilateral environmental agreements or conventions; as such the GEF assists countries in meeting their 
obligations under the conventions.” GEF website, “What is the GEF?” 
51
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its tenth session, 
Decision 5/CP.7, pp. 33-35 
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fund and/or adaptation fund is designed to provide support for the prompt implementation 
adaptation activities, monitoring climate-affected disease vectors, forecasting of severe 
weather events, and building capacity.52 However, the GEF and the climate 
change/adaptation fund are simply mechanisms designed to facilitate compliance with the 
UNFCCC, and do not play a significant role in terms of NAPA development.  
 As a further response to the specific situation of LDCs, the UNFCCC established 
an LDC work program, intended in part to support NAPA preparation.53 The work 
program addresses the LDCs’ inability to convey their “urgent and immediate needs in 
respect of their vulnerability and adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change.”54 
The information contained in NAPAs “would help to build capacity” for responding to 
these needs. The UNFCCC, therefore, sets out NAPA development guidelines. NAPAs 
should be easily-comprehensible, country-driven and action-oriented, and should 
prioritize the LDCs’ most pressing adaptation needs.55 Specific guiding elements include 
a participatory process, a country-driven approach, a multidisciplinary approach, a 
complementary approach taking into account extant programs, sustainable development, 
gender equality, sound environmental management, cost-effectiveness, simplicity, and 
flexibility.56  
 The NAPA preparation process consists of setting up a national NAPA team 
“composed of a lead agency and representatives of stakeholders including government 
                                                 
52UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its tenth session, 
Decision 5/CP.7, pp. 35-36 
53
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its tenth session, 
Decision 5/CP.7, p. 36 
54
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
28/CP.7, p. 7 
55
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
28/CP.7, p. 8 
56
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
28/CP.7, p. 9 
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agencies and civil society.”57 This team, in turn, assembles a group to compile 
information on the effects of climate change and coping strategies, to carry out a 
participatory vulnerability assessment, to identify crucial adaptation measures, and to 
identify and prioritize criteria for the selection of specific activities.58 A consultative 
process generates adaptation ideas, and the national NAPA team turns these ideas into 
adaptation activities. Evaluating the proposed activities with the specified criteria yields a 
prioritized list of the most important adaptation activities. Following a specific, 
UNFCCC-designed format, the NAPA team then creates profiles of the priority activities. 
Profiles include a title, rationale, description (objectives, inputs, short- and long-term 
outcomes), and implementation strategy (involved institutions, risks, evaluation, financial 
resources, etc.).59 Next, the document is reviewed by the public and revised if necessary, 
and a final review is conducted by a team of representatives from both government and 
civil society. Finally, after endorsement by the national government, the NAPA is 
disseminated to the public and to the UNFCCC secretariat.60  
 The UNFCCC also suggests a structure for the NAPA document. An introduction 
should include relevant country-specific background information. A framework for the 
adaptation program should give an overview of the present and future negative impacts of 
climate change, how the NAPA relates to the country’s existing development goals, and 
                                                 
57
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
28/CP.7, p. 9 
58
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
28/CP.7, pp. 9-10 
59UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
28/CP.7, p. 10 
60
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
28/CP.7, p. 11 
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possible obstacles in implementing the NAPA.61 The next section should identify vital 
adaptation needs and pinpoint relevant adaptation strategies (such as policy reform and 
capacity building). Then, the NAPA should set out its criteria for the selection of priority 
activities. While it is ultimately up to the LDC to develop its own list of criteria, the 
UNFCCC proposes that the criteria include “level or degree of adverse effects of climate 
change; poverty reduction to enhance adaptive capacity; synergy with other multilateral 
environmental agreements; and cost-effectiveness.”62 The criteria should apply to a 
number of sectors, such as health, agriculture, water, infrastructure, land-use 
management, and coastal zones.63 Finally, the document should contain the profiles of the 
selected priority activities.  
 An LDC expert group (LEG) has been established by the UNFCCC in order to 
provide LDCs with advice on preparing and implementing their NAPAs. This includes 
technical advice for identifying data and advice on the “capacity-building needs for LDCs 
in support of the preparation and implementation of NAPAs.”64 The UNFCCC intends 
that the LEG be comprised of twelve competent experts. Five of the experts should be 
from African LDCs, two from Asian LDCs, two from Small Island Developing State 
LDCs, and three Annex II countries.65 Therefore, the members of the LEG appropriately 
represent the regions of the world where adaptation needs are greatest.  
                                                 
61
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
28/CP.7, p. 11 
62
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
28/CP.7, p. 12 
63
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
28/CP.7, p. 12 
64
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
29/CP.7, p. 15 
65
 UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision 
29/CP.7, Annex, p. 15 
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NAPAs ideally will lead to long-term adaptation to the effects of climate change. 
One would assume, therefore, that these documents would be designed to increase all the 
major types of capacity required for effective adaptation. However, while the NAPA 
development process attempts to incorporate knowledge from a range of international, 
national, and local experts and stakeholders, and while the NAPA documents tend to 
prioritize technology-based adaptation, the NAPAs do not include specific plans for 
increasing state capacity. Many scholars believe that state capacity is an important 
component of adaptation.66 In multiple instances, the UNFCCC mentions the need for 
capacity. It is curious, then, that the NAPAs that I have investigated appear to lack 
capacity-building plans.  
Case Studies 
Using three Sub-Saharan African LDCs as case studies, I investigate the role of 
capacity in the NAPAs, and attempt to explain why state capacity-building seems to be 
missing from the NAPAs’ prioritized adaptation plans. Burkina Faso, Senegal, and 
Tanzania provide interesting case studies. These countries experience a range of climate-
related vulnerabilities and have all developed NAPAs. All three countries have signed 
and ratified the Kyoto Protocol, a binding climate change agreement related to the 
UNFCCC, and belong to the non-Annex I group, meaning that, unlike the advanced 
industrialized countries, they are not obligated to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. 
While Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Tanzania clearly fit into the category of LDCs in Sub-
Saharan Africa, their differing circumstances in terms of economic diversity, natural 
resources, and level of development lead to variations in their vulnerabilities and 
                                                 
66
 The theories of scholars such as Barbara Connolly, Robert Keohane, Marc Levy, and Peter Haas will be 
examined in the following chapter.  
 18 
capacities to adapt, and make them useful countries to investigate. Because the countries 
experience different sets of climate-related vulnerabilities and have different levels of 
existing state capacity, a comparison of the three countries helps to provide insight as to 
why the NAPAs do not prioritize capacity-building adaptation plans. Burkina Faso is the 
most resource-poor out of the three, Tanzania has the most corrupt government, and 
Senegal has maintained the closest relationship with its former colonizer.  
Tanzania ranks 159th out of 177 countries in the Human Development Index, 
between Burkina Faso and Senegal.67 The life expectancy is 51.0 years, lower than either 
Burkina Faso or Senegal. However, the adult literacy rate is 69.468 - much higher than 
either of the other countries. Like Senegal, Tanzania is a coastal country. Other 
noteworthy geographic features include Lake Victoria and Mount Kilimanjaro. Like both 
Burkina Faso and Senegal, emission levels are lower than average for Sub-Saharan 
Africa; though Tanzania contains 0.6% of the global population, average per capita 
carbon dioxide emissions are only 0.1 tons. Tanzania accounts for 0.0% of the world’s 
emissions. To compare, OECD countries comprise 15% of the global population and 
account for nearly 50% of global emissions.69  
Burkina Faso is the only landlocked country out of the three. It is also the poorest 
and least developed. Ranked 176th out of 177 countries in the Human Development 
Index, the country’s level of poverty is below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa as a 
whole.70 With a population of 13 million,71 life expectancy is 51.4 years, and only 23.6 
percent of adults are literate. The economy of Burkina Faso depends heavily on cotton 
                                                 
67
 Human Development Report 2007/2008, Country Fact Sheets – Tanzania 
68
 Human Development Report 2007/2008, Country Fact Sheets – Tanzania 
69
 Human Development Report 2007/2008, Country Fact Sheets – Tanzania 
70
 Human Development Report 2007/2008, Country Fact Sheets – Burkina Faso 
71
 World Bank, Burkina Faso Country Brief 
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exports and is considerably less diversified than Senegal or Tanzania’s economies. 
Burkina Faso has fewer natural resources than the other two countries, and receives 
minimal rainfall.72 In terms of climate change, Burkina Faso’s emission levels are lower 
than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, “with 0.2% of the world’s 
population, Burkina Faso accounts for 0.0% of global emissions – an average of 0.1 tons 
of CO2 per person.”73 In comparison, in 2004 the United States had per capita carbon 
dioxide emissions of 20.6 tons.74  
Senegal, a country of 10.8 million inhabitants,75 ranks 156th out of 177 countries 
in the Human Development Index.76 This HDI ranking is the highest of the three 
countries studied. Located on a coast, Senegal has more natural resources than Burkina 
Faso. Groundnuts, the chemical industry, services, tourism, and fisheries dominate the 
Senegalese economy, which more diversified than the economies of Burkina Faso or 
Tanzania.77 Senegal’s GDP growth rates have been higher than average for Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Life expectancy is 62.3 years – a considerably higher value than for the other two 
countries. 39.3 percent of adults are literate, more than in Burkina Faso but less than in 
Tanzania. Like Burkina Faso, Senegal accounts for 0.0% of the world’s carbon dioxide 
emissions. Senegal comprises 0.2% of the global population, and emits on average 0.4 
tons of carbon dioxide per inhabitant, a slightly higher per capita emission level than that 
of Burkina Faso or Tanzania.  
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As shown by their emission levels, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Senegal make 
negligible contributions to climate change. Though the LDCs are not responsible for 
creating anthropogenic climate change, they are extremely vulnerable to its negative 
effects. Agriculture and livestock involve a huge percentage of the populations of the 
three countries, and these sectors are particularly susceptible to climate change impacts 
such as rainfall variability. Tanzania and Senegal also depend on their fishing industries, 
but sea-level rise, changes in water temperature, and coastal erosion threaten this means 
of livelihood. The need for adaptation is increasingly urgent, and the UNFCCC-designed 
NAPAs are intended to set forth effective adaptation plans.  
Strategies to increase state capacity – a crucial component of adaptation, 
according to many scholars – appear to be missing from the NAPA documents. In this 
thesis, I explore reasons for why capacity-building is not a prominent component of the 
prioritized adaptation strategies. I conduct an assessment of how capacity fits into the 
NAPAs of the three case study countries. I also examine the climate-related 
vulnerabilities as perceived by the LDCs themselves and the country’s existing levels of 
capacity. I pay particular attention to the countries’ existing state capacity as an 
explanation for the omission of capacity-building adaptation plans. In addition, I will 
investigate the specific vulnerabilities of Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Tanzania, and how 
well the countries are addressing these vulnerabilities in their NAPAs. I had also planned 
to examine the advisory role of the UNFCCC, and to look at whether the advice provided 
by the UNFCCC discouraged the integration of capacity-building plans; however, I 
elected not to continue this particular investigation, as my initial findings suggested that 
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the advisory role of the UNFCCC did not in fact influence the capacity-building content 
of the NAPAs.  
 I begin my study with a theoretical chapter on capacity and the NAPAs. I define 
capacity, explain the need for capacity, and outline scholarly theories on capacity-
building in terms of adaptation to climate change. In this chapter, I also introduce my 
hypotheses and explain my methodology. I will argue that capacity-building plans have 
been omitted from the prioritized lists in the NAPAs of Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and 
Senegal for two principal reasons: One, the countries themselves lack the capacity to 
implement capacity-building adaptation strategies. Two, as a result of colonial legacies, 
governments lack the capacity to even develop capacity-building plans. To test these 
hypotheses, I will analyze the NAPA content, the climate-related vulnerabilities, and the 
historical background of each country. I use the Environmental Sustainability Index as a 
measure of existing capacity.  
After the theoretical chapter, I include a chapter for each of the three case study 
countries. In the first case study chapter, on Tanzania, I illustrate the NAPA development 
process in detail. I show that Tanzania’s NAPA follows the UNCCC’s guidelines, 
addresses a number of the country’s climate-related vulnerabilities, and yet fails to 
include any capacity-building plans. Tanzania’s low level of existing state capacity 
explains this omission. The colonial legacy appears to have contributed to the poor ability 
of the government to function. In the following chapter, I explore the severity of Burkina 
Faso’s climate situation. I also demonstrate that, while the NAPA matches up with the 
structure proposed by the UNFCCC, the country makes no mention of capacity-building 
in its list of prioritized adaptation strategies. Like Tanzania, Burkina Faso has a weak 
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government and suffers from a rough colonial history. Senegal is somewhat different 
from the other two countries, even though it experiences almost the exact same climate-
related vulnerabilities as Tanzania. Like the other countries, Senegal’s NAPA does not 
include capacity-building in its final list of priority adaptation activities. However, this 
NAPA pays much greater attention to the need for capacity than the other NAPAs in this 
study. Senegal appears to have a greater amount of existing state capacity than Burkina 
Faso or Tanzania. Furthermore, Senegal experienced a smooth transition to independence 
and maintained a close relationship with its former colonizer.  
Overall, I will argue that capacity-building plans have not been included in the 
NAPAs’ prioritized adaptation activities because of low state capacity and, in some cases, 
colonial legacy. In all three countries – and in sub-Saharan LDCs in general – poor, rural 
populations are the groups the most vulnerable to climate change. These groups would 
likely be unable to implement adaptation plans that have a capacity-building focus, and 
those responsible for the development of NAPAs might have purposely selected priority 
activities that the most vulnerable groups would be able to execute. Tanzania and Burkina 
Faso have extremely low levels of state capacity; the poorly-functioning governments 
struggle to provide even the most basic services, and are unable to develop capacity-
building plans. Likewise, both of these countries have faced governmental difficulties 
ever since their independence from colonial rule. Senegal, on the other hand, has enjoyed 
relatively stable and effective governance – in part thanks to a positive colonial legacy. 
Consequently, the Senegalese government seems to have a higher level of state capacity 
than the other two cases, and Senegal’s NAPA demonstrates a greater awareness of the 
need for capacity-building.  
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II. Capacity-Building and Adaptation from a Theoretical Perspective 
 
 Most theorists agree that state capacity is an important factor in increasing a 
country’s ability to adapt to the effects of climate change. However, the National 
Adaptation Programs of Action of least-developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do 
not seem to consider capacity building to be a priority. The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the institution backing the NAPA preparation process, 
recognizes that LDCs lack the capacity to adapt to climate change, and sometimes even 
lack the capacity to communicate their climate-related vulnerabilities and needs.78  Why, 
then, have countries failed to include specific plans for capacity-building in the NAPA 
documents’ prioritized lists of adaptation activities? An examination of climate-related 
vulnerabilities, NAPA content, and country characteristics leads to two major hypotheses 
for why this may be the case. The hypotheses concentrate on the African LDCs’ own 
perceptions of vulnerabilities to climate change and the countries’ developmental 
situation. Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Senegal provide useful case studies with which to 
test these hypotheses.  
This chapter includes explanations of the approach behind NAPA development, 
capacity-building, my hypotheses, and methodology. The NAPAs are intended to follow 
a country-driven, bottom-up approach, indicating that each individual LDC is responsible 
for developing its own climate change adaptation plans. Definitions and theories on 
capacity-building demonstrate the need for capacity in order to adapt to climate change. 
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Colonial history and indicators from the Environmental Sustainability Index and the 
Human Development Report provide a picture of each country’s level of development, 
including state capacity. In particular, I use education, social and institutional capacity, 
and scientific and technical capacity as indicators of state capacity. In light of the NAPA 
approach, the importance of capacity, and the low level of existing capacity in LDCs, I 
develop hypotheses to explain why the NAPAs do not contain adaptation strategies that 
focus on capacity-building.  
The NAPA Approach 
In 2001, the seventh Conference of Parties acknowledged that LDCs have a 
unique situation and lack the capability to cope with the challenges of adapting to the 
negative effects of climate change.79 In response to this recognition, the UNFCCC 
established an LDC work program and initiated the development of National Adaptation 
Programs of Action (NAPAs). The NAPA documents are designed to “prioritize urgent 
adaptation needs” and to “draw on existing information and community-level input” in 
order to pinpoint adaptation projects that will allow countries to deal with the immediate 
impacts of climate change.80 The UNFCCC reasons that since LDCs have such 
constricted abilities to adapt, the most appropriate step forward is a new approach 
designed specifically for these types of countries. The intention is that NAPAs will 
“focus on enhancing capacity to adapt to climate variability, which itself [will] help 
address the adverse affects of climate change.”81 In the previous chapter, I explained the 
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specific guidelines and frameworks set forth by the UNFCCC for the preparation of the 
NAPA documents.  
The NAPA programs should consider strategies to cope with climate change that 
already exist at local levels, and should use these strategies as the starting points for the 
identification of priority activities.82 The alternative would be a top-down approach that 
begins with scenario-based modeling and looks at future vulnerabilities and long-term 
national policies, which would be less effective in addressing urgent present-day needs – 
“those for which further delay could increase vulnerability or lead to increased costs at a 
later stage.”83 The NAPA process gives a high degree of prominence to community-level 
input because communities often are the main stakeholders and have local information 
that could be valuable in greater contexts.84  Furthermore, the UNFCCC believes that a 
bottom-up, country-driven approach is the best option because it ensures that states have 
an active interest in following through with their adaptation plans.85 If a wide range of 
stakeholders participate in the NAPA preparation process, then the final document should 
reflect what the country as a whole perceives to be its principal adaptation needs. 
Everyone involved, from the national government to local communities, should be 
motivated to implement the adaptation efforts. However, capacity is required in order for 
successful adaptation to occur. Given the bottom-up, participatory nature of NAPA 
development, I investigate country-level explanations for why the NAPAs do not include 
capacity-building plans. Do the NAPAs lack capacity-building because of the country’s 
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own perceptions of vulnerabilities to climate change? Are the countries simply unable to 
develop capacity-building plans because they lack the state capacity to do so?  
Definitions 
In order to understand the importance of building adaptation capacity in 
vulnerable countries, it is helpful to be familiar with the terminology. Definitions of 
capacity distinguish between capacity-building and adaptation capacity. The IPCC 
describes adaptation capacity as “the ability of a system to adjust to climate change 
(including climate variability and extremes), to moderate potential damages, to take 
advantages of opportunities, or to cope with consequences.”86 The UNFCCC defines 
capacity-building as “the process of developing technical skills and institutional 
capability in developing countries and economies in transition to enable them to address 
effectively the causes and results of climate change.”87 In this report, I concentrate on 
capacity-building, with a focus on the capability to adapt to the adverse effects of climate 
change. The technical skills and institutional capabilities required for a country to adapt 
to climate change include technology and expertise to determine appropriate policy 
responses; the ability of stakeholders (including communities and local NGOs) to 
participate in decision-making; and administrative and legal frameworks to develop, 
implement, and enforce new policies.88 Overall, I will use the term “state capacity” to 
refer to this type of capacity to adapt, including technical/intellectual capacity for 
appropriate policy development; the capacity for participation in decision-making; and 
political/administrative capacity for policy implementation. 
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The Need for Capacity 
 Climate-related hazards such as droughts, floods, and severe storms affect 
millions of Africans annually.89 African LDCs experience a number of stresses that 
exacerbate the impacts of climate change, including poverty, infectious disease, fragile 
environments, unsustainable development, and limited institutional capacities.90 Disaster 
risk reduction theory suggests three major activity areas: risk assessment, risk 
management practices, and the implementation. Well-designed policies and institutional 
competence are required for assessment and management activities to be carried out.91 
These activities would benefit efforts to adapt to the effects of climate change. Building 
the capacity to respond to climatic variability should be part of a country’s adaptation 
strategies. “Adaptation initiatives need to be developed on a frank assessment of the real 
problems faced in Africa and should be targeted at decision processes that have long-term 
implications, for example, in respect to land use legislation, urban planning and public 
infrastructure.”92 Strategies to deal with future climatic variability should begin with 
building capacity to tackle current climatic variability. The NAPAs of Tanzania, Burkina 
Faso, and Senegal do not include specific capacity-building projects of this nature.  
 Some African countries, including LDCs, have voiced their desire to increase the 
capacities that they require in order to “effectively implement their commitments under 
the [UNFCCC].”93 This capacity-building consists of networking and information 
sharing, developing human resources, and strengthening institutions.94 Although 
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implementing the UNFCCC is different from implementing a well-designed NAPA, 
many of the capacity requirements overlap. Assessments of climate-related vulnerabilities 
and adaptation strategies involve a number of socio-economic sectors, including water 
resources, agriculture, forestry, coastal zones, and human health.95 Academic, scientific, 
technical and research institutions, as well as non-governmental organizations, are of key 
importance. Vulnerability and adaptation assessments require extensive data collection 
and analysis, and sometimes involve the use of computer modeling and other advanced 
technologies. Sharing information and expertise can facilitate the analysis process. It is 
also important to improve the capacity for incorporating climate change policies into 
national development plans, for policy-making, and for linking policy and science.96  
Scholarly theories on capacity-building 
Scholars put forth varying theories about how best to increase a country’s 
capacity to adapt to climate change. Barbara Connolly focuses largely on political 
capacity. She argues that increasing the political capacity of local environmental NGOs is 
a highly effective way to promote the environmental concern necessary for successful 
adaptation.97 NGOs often are able to inspire self-interest among local communities and 
governments, and thus encourage a country to develop adaptation initiatives. 
Furthermore, increasing a country’s political capacity can reduce the country’s 
dependence on external support.98 International organizations can help to enhance a 
country’s political capacity by increasing the effectiveness of financial transfers in areas 
where capacity and concern intersect. For instance, financial transfers can build a 
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country’s capability to implement environmental reforms.99 Sustained financial aid helps 
cover the costs of maintaining environmental programs, “by funding technical assistance 
to create long-term mechanisms, providing seed money, or incorporating conditionality 
lending to reforms that will yield sustainable revenues.”100 However, NAPAs are not 
likely to propose adaptation strategies that require exterior financial transfers, because of 
their country-driven nature.  
Connolly emphasizes several major lines of inquiry regarding aid and capacity-
building: identification of missing capacity, self-interest of the institution that provides 
the aid, and the recipient country’s level of concern.101 Increasing the effectiveness of aid 
programs depends on correctly identifying the missing form and location of capacity. 
Providing aid solely to increase a government’s technical capacity may be ineffective if 
the country lacks the political and administrative capacities required to implement new 
technology-focused policies.102 Although the NAPAs do not involve external aid, 
Connolly’s theory is relevant here because many LDCs, such as Tanzania and Burkina 
Faso, have poorly functioning governments that are sometimes incapable of carrying out 
basic tasks of the nation-state, never mind implementing climate change strategies.  
Connolly also theorizes that even if an aid-providing institution is able to discern 
the appropriate type of capacity required by the recipient country, the institution’s own 
self-interests may stand in its way.103 This statement can also apply to the need for 
cooperation between the different government ministries that are implicated in NAPA 
implementation. Additionally, it is helpful if the involved actors have a real interest in 
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building capacity to adapt to climate change impacts; “interventions to augment recipient 
capacity are especially profitable in areas where capacity and concern are mutually 
reinforcing.”104 For exterior capacity-building aid to be most beneficial, the recipient 
country must be genuinely concerned about its vulnerabilities and therefore eager to 
increase its adaptation efforts once its capacities have been improved.105 A lack of 
concern could be more of a constraint than a lack of capacity; aid to generate capacity is 
unlikely to lead to adaptation if the country is not motivated to act. Likewise, adaptation 
plans proposed by the NAPAs are more likely to be successful if the country’s citizens 
are motivated to respond to climate-related vulnerabilities.  
Robert Keohane stresses the importance of a high level of concern within a 
country receiving aid to enhance its capacity to adapt to the effects of climate change. 
Similar to Connolly’s argument, Keohane believes that if a lack of capacity is the main 
constraint and concern is high, providing capacity-building aid may lead to greater efforts 
by the country involved.106 Building capacity is difficult even if a recipient country has a 
strong desire to adapt to climate change, as the NAPAs suggest. Keohane mentions that, 
in the situation of exterior capacity-building aid, donor institutions often face significant 
challenges that have nothing to do with the recipient country’s level of concern.  
According to Keohane, sovereignty issues and poor strategies on the part of 
international institutions constitute the chief obstacles to effective capacity-building. 
International institutions often are not authorized to enforce rules within jurisdiction of 
sovereign states. Since these institutions – primarily the UNFCCC and the GEF, in terms 
of adapting to the effects of climate change – usually are unable to carry out large scale 
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projects on their own, they must rely on national governments or domestic NGOs to 
implement their recommendations and to ensure that the aid is used properly. Therefore, 
the capacity of the recipient country is crucial.107 Sometimes international institutions try 
to find problems in LDCs that match formerly-proposed solutions, instead of developing 
new solutions for country-specific problems. However, even if an institution provides the 
appropriate type of aid to enhance capacity, it may have little effect “if the fundamental 
issue is a lack of concern.”108 As Connolly points out, aid will likely be much more 
effective if the recipient country has a strong desire to adapt.  
Keohane builds upon his theory in collaboration with Marc Levy and Peter Haas. 
The three scholars underline the value of technical capacity in addition to concern. 
National governments require technical capacity in order to develop appropriate policies 
or regulations that take into account “both the environmental realities and the political 
and economic incentives facing governments, firms, and other organizations that can 
affect outcomes.”109 Even with pressure from international and domestic organizations, 
governments at both national and local levels sometimes lack the capacity to implement 
policy change. If an LDC does not have sufficient technical capacity, the government 
may be “technically ignorant” and thus less able develop effective adaptation strategies. 
Even if non-governmental actors proposed the adaptation strategies, “technically 
ignorant” governments might be unable to evaluate the costs and benefits of these 
plans.110 In the case of the NAPAs, the NAPA teams require technical capacity to carry 
out their vulnerability assessments and to evaluate proposed priority activities. Keohane, 
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Levy, and Haas believe that technical capacity is generally necessary in order to come up 
with appropriate policy responses. However, once “regulations have been specified and 
agreed upon, the burden of action shifts to national responses, which are often inhibited 
by low political and administrative capacity.”111 Therefore, a country requires strong 
capacities in a variety of areas in order to develop and implement adaptation strategies.  
The three scholars state that international institutions can increase technical, 
political, and administrative capacities in LDCs through a number of mechanisms. In 
terms of adaptation to climate change, the UNFCCC is an institution that could 
potentially enhance capacity in LDCs through its advisory role in the NAPA preparation 
process. As “vehicles for transferring skills and expertise, and for empowering domestic 
actors,”112 institutions provide capacity-building aid by sharing norms, technology, and 
information.113 The spread of international norms, rules, and principles sets in motion 
conditions for state capacity-building and policy implementation.114 Often, the 
internalization of norms and principles precedes the adoption of binding rules. A country 
is more likely to adhere to new regulations if the regulations reflect existing values. It is 
also important for a government to already have the capacity to develop and enforce 
appropriate policies before rules are implemented. While NAPAs are not binding, states 
might be more likely to prioritize certain adaptation strategies if these strategies fit into 
existing national norms. Ensuring that the NAPAs reflect national norms and community 
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practices is part of the rationale behind the UNFCCC-recommended country-driven 
approach.  
Keohane, Levy, and Haas have categorized the capacity-building efforts of 
international institutions into three general areas: increasing concern, enhancing the 
contractual environment, and building national capacity.115 In the first category, 
institutions reveal direct and indirect linkages of issues, compile and distribute scientific 
information, and generate opportunities to intensify domestic pressure on policy-
makers.116 The UNFCCC fits into this category through its role in the NAPA 
development process. By encouraging all LDCs to develop a NAPA, the UNFCCC has 
increased concern in respect to climate-related vulnerabilities. Additionally, the 
UNFCCC has recommended that each NAPA include a section that explains the linkages 
between the NAPA and existing national environment/development programs – thus, the 
UNFCCC contributes to issue linkage. Secondly, institutions are able to provide 
negotiation arenas that both reduce transaction costs and facilitate the decision-making 
process, monitor environmental quality, policy, and performance, and increase 
accountability. Lastly, international institutions can increase national capacity by building 
interorganizational networks to share technical and management expertise, transfer 
financial assistance and policy-relevant information, and strengthen domestic 
bureaucratic power.117 The UNFCCC has not significantly contributed to increasing the 
capacity of LDCs, since the NAPA is intended to be completely developed and carried 
out by the individual countries themselves . Overall, theorists argue that international 
institutions can play a major role in building the capacities of LDCs to adapt to the 
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impacts of climate change, and also argue that technical, political, and administrative 
capacities are required for effective adaptation.  
Hypotheses and selection of case studies 
Connolly, Keohane, Levy, and Haas all believe that international institutions can 
assist LDCs in their endeavors to build the capacity necessary for adaptation to climate 
change, and that the recipient country must have a high level of concern if capacity-
building aid is to be effective. Connolly emphasizes the need to build political capacity, 
whereas Keohane, Levy, and Haas stress the importance of technical capacity. The fact 
that African LDCs have developed NAPAs indicates that they are concerned about their 
ability to adapt to the effects of climate change, yet the NAPA documents make very 
little mention of building state capacity, including technical/intellectual capacity and 
political/administrative capacity. In several instances, the NAPAs list the institutional 
actors who will be responsible for implementing specific adaptation programs. Senegal’s 
NAPA even cites lack of capacity as a principle obstacle to adaptation.118 Nevertheless, 
none of the countries’ NAPAs propose specific adaptation plans designed to build 
capacity. Using Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Tanzania as case studies, I will explore the 
following hypotheses to explain why this might have occurred: (1) African LDCs, 
particularly poor, rural populations, lack the capacity to implement capacity-building 
adaptation plans. The countries’ highest priorities are adaptation strategies that even the 
most vulnerable populations are able to implement;119 and (2) as a result of colonial 
legacies, some LDC governments simply lack the capacity to design capacity-building 
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plans.120 In the beginning stages of this study, I also hypothesized that the UNFCCC-
designed process for creating the NAPAs is too action-oriented to include relatively 
passive adaptation strategies such as capacity-building. Therefore, I had speculated that 
NAPAs might not contain capacity-building because international advising institutions 
are not leading them in that direction.121 However, my initial research yielded results that 
contradicted this hypothesis, and I did not explore the hypothesis further.  
Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Senegal make valuable case studies for several 
reasons. They are all LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa, one of the world’s most vulnerable 
regions to climate change. While Senegal and Tanzania are located on coasts, and while 
Tanzania has Mount Kilimanjaro and Lake Victoria, Burkina Faso is landlocked and 
extremely arid; geographic characteristics might influence a country’s vulnerabilities and 
its capacity to adapt. Senegal has a higher level of development than the other two 
countries, which likely has a positive effect on its capacity-building prospects. All three 
countries have developed NAPAs over the past several years. Overall, the primary 
similarities of the three NAPAs include the basic structure and the prioritization of 
adaptation plans addressing agriculture. The documents open with a country background, 
an overview of the NAPA development process, the objectives of the NAPA, and the 
project selection and prioritization criteria. A section in each NAPA demonstrates the 
linkages between the NAPA and existing sustainable development programs. The 
documents also identify the climate-related vulnerabilities of each main societal structure 
or geographic zone. At the end of the document, the profiles of the top-priority adaptation 
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projects are listed. These profiles include a justification of the project, objectives, 
anticipated outcomes, the costs of specific activities, and a list of the institutions that will 
play a role in the project’s implementation. Slight differences between the NAPAs are 
found in the amount of detail of specific activities in the project profiles, the criteria for 
the selection and prioritization of projects, and the inclusion of a section on potential 
barriers to implementation.  
To test my hypotheses, I first carry out an investigation of the climate-related 
vulnerabilities of each of the three countries. I examine the NAPAs in the context of the 
scholarly theories, looking for mentions of capacity-building, and I investigate how well 
the NAPAs addressed the countries’ vulnerabilities to the effects of climate change. In 
order to gain an understanding of existing state capacity, I investigate the political and 
economic situations of the case study countries. Historical backgrounds and indicators 
from the Environmental Sustainability Index are particularly valuable tools for measuring 
state capacity. I will demonstrate that the lack of capacity-building in the NAPAs 
corresponds to low levels of state capacity, which in turn can be explained by colonial 
legacies.  
Methodology 
The 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) provides a useful tool with 
which to measure environmental sustainability, vulnerability, and capacity to adapt. The 
ESI consists of five broad categories, which are divided into twenty-one uniformly-
weighted indicators and then further broken down into seventy-six data sets. Higher 
degrees of specification allow one to more accurately gauge an individual country’s 
capacity and environmental situation. In terms of examining a country’s capacity-
 37 
building potential, the Reducing Human Vulnerability and Social and Institutional 
Capacity categories provide the most useful information.  
The indicators in the Reducing Human Vulnerability category are Environmental 
Health, Basic Human Sustenance, and Reducing Environment-Related Natural Disaster 
Vulnerability. Data sets for Environmental Health measure the death rate from intestinal 
infectious diseases, the child death rate from respiratory diseases, and child mortality per 
1,000 live births. The most relevant data sets under Basic Human Sustenance are 
percentage of undernourished in total population, and percentage of population with 
access to improved drinking water source. Reducing Environment-Related Natural 
Disaster Vulnerability data sets incorporate the average number of deaths per million 
inhabitants from floods, tropical cyclones and droughts, and the Environmental Hazard 
Exposure Index.122 
The Social and Institutional Capacity category includes Environmental 
Governance, Eco-Efficiency, and Science and Technology. Several of the data sets for 
the Environmental Governance indicator are corruption measure, government 
effectiveness, percentage of total land area under protected status, local Agenda 21 
initiatives per million people, civil and political liberties, knowledge creation in 
environmental science, technology and policy; and democracy measure. Eco-efficiency 
data sets measure energy efficiency, and hydropower and renewable energy production as 
a percentage of total energy consumption. Data sets for the Science and Technology 
indicator include an innovation index, a digital access index, female primary education 
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completion rate, gross tertiary enrollment rate, and number of researchers per million 
inhabitants.123  
Several specific ESI indicators correspond to the theories put forth by Connolly, 
Keohane, Levy, and Haas, and relate to the three hypotheses concerning the NAPAs’ lack 
of capacity-building plans. The values for the Environmental Health and Basic Human 
Sustenance variables could indicate a country’s level of concern, relating to Keohane’s 
principal theory. If the health and food supply of a country’s population are endangered 
as a result of the effects of climate change, the country will likely have a high level of 
concern and be motivated to respond. The Environmental Governance indicator could 
serve as a measure of a country’s political capacity, a focal point for Connolly. Eco-
Efficiency and Science and Technology might reveal a country’s level of technical 
capacity, which is emphasized by Keohane, Levy, and Haas. Overall, based on the ESI 
data sets, it appears as though all three countries should have high levels of concern and 
low levels of political and technical capacity. Therefore, do the NAPAs fail to include 
capacity-building in their prioritized adaptation plans because they perceive other 
adaptation strategies to be more urgent? Do the LDCs lack the domestic technical and 
intellectual expertise to identify their capacity needs and propose corresponding capacity-
building strategies in the first place?  
The ESI indicators that relate the most clearly to the NAPAs of Tanzania, Burkina 
Faso, and Senegal are Environmental Health, Basic Human Sustenance, and Reducing 
Environment-Related Natural Disaster Vulnerability, under the Reducing Human 
Vulnerability Category. Under the category of Social and Institutional Capacity, the Eco-
Efficiency and Science and Technology indicators relate the most to the adaptation 
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strategies put forth by the NAPAs. In 2005, the ESI indicator values for Tanzania, 
Burkina Faso, and Senegal, respectively, were as follows: Environmental Health, -0.75,  
-0.95, -0.45; Basic Human Sustenance, -1.08, -0.90, -0.52; Reducing Environment-
Related Natural Disaster Vulnerability, 0.49, 0.67, 0.46; Eco-Efficiency, 0.93, 0.23, -
0.07; and Science and Technology, -0.63, -1.47, -0.74. The NAPAs imply that there is a 
high level of concern about the negative implications climate change will have for human 
health. Tanzania’s NAPA gives much attention to diseases that are exacerbated by the 
various effects of climate change. All three countries prioritize adaptation plans related to 
agriculture, since climate change greatly endangers the ability of their populations to 
sustain themselves. Early warning systems for climate-related hazards are also high on 
the countries’ lists of priorities. In terms of eco-efficiency, the NAPAs of all countries 
included plans to install renewable energy sources in households.  
It is noteworthy that specific strategies for how to build state capacity, including 
technical/intellectual capacity and political/administrative capacity, are absent from all 
three NAPAs. Another interesting absence is a mention of international aid. As the 
theorists point out, capacity-building and aid from international institutions are often 
interrelated. If an LDC wished to build technical capacity, for example, it would likely 
require external aid in the form of funding, a technology transfer, or outside expertise. 
The UNFCCC already promotes providing aid to LDCs through the Clean Development 
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, and climate change and adaptation funds provide 
additional financial resources for NAPA adaptation activities.124 Furthermore, it is likely 
that the NAPAs do not mention international aid simply because the countries wish to 
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become self-sufficient in their adaptation efforts. The NAPAs are intended to yield 
sustainable adaptation strategies that are able to be implemented by the countries 
themselves. A reliance on outside organizations might perpetuate the vulnerability of 
LDCs, causing them to depend on external aid rather than developing domestic 
mechanisms to respond to in-country challenges. Given the assumption that LDCs want 
to avoid dependence on outside aid, it is interesting that the NAPAs do not contain 
domestic capacity-building plans. If Connolly is correct about the importance of political 
capacity in terms of adapting to the effects of climate change, then the actors involved in 
the NAPA development process overlooked a significant component of effective 
adaptation. While all three NAPAs stressed the importance of technology (for early 
warning systems, agriculture, irrigation, and renewable energy, among others), none of 
the documents proposed measures to actually build technological capacity. Under the 
presumption that the UNFCCC provided the correct guidelines for developing the 
NAPAs, in the next chapters I test my hypotheses as to why the NAPAs do not contain 
capacity-building plans. Is long-term capacity-building not as urgent as other adaptation 
priorities? Do the LDCs ironically lack the capacity required in order develop adaptation 
plans designed to build state capacity?  
Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Tanzania have finalized their NAPAs relatively 
recently. Out of the three countries, Senegal published its NAPA first, in 2006. Tanzania 
finished its NAPA in January, 2007, and Burkina Faso in November, 2007. It may be too 
early to study results in order to determine the effectiveness of the documents in terms of 
successful adaptation to climate change. However, one can gain valuable insight from the 
NAPA development process and from how well the NAPA adaptation plans correspond 
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to the country’s climate-related vulnerabilities. In the context of the ESI indicators and 
the scholarly theories on capacity-building, I examine the NAPA preparation process and 
the role of the UNFCCC, the countries’ vulnerabilities to climate change, the priority 
adaptation projects found in the NAPAs, and the domestic situations of the three 
countries in terms of geography, natural resources, education, economy, government, and 
historical background.  
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III. Tanzania 
 
Tanzania’s Vulnerability to Climate Change 
As a result of its diverse geography, heavy dependence on natural resources, and 
low level of development, Tanzania experiences a range of climate-related 
vulnerabilities. The country’s National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) is 
designed to address these urgent vulnerabilities. However, an examination of Tanzania’s 
NAPA content in light of scholarly theories on effective adaptation to climate change 
suggests that the NAPA may be missing certain essential elements. The NAPA addresses 
the physical effects of climate change, but fails to include plans for building state 
capacity – an important component of long-term sustainability and successful adaptation. 
Two possible hypotheses, as introduced in the previous chapter, help to explain the 
disconnect between the contents of Tanzania’s NAPA and what the scholars mentioned in 
the previous chapter believe is required for least developed countries to adapt to climate 
change. Do Tanzanians simply view other adaptation priorities – adaptation strategies 
that even the most vulnerable groups have the capacity to implement – as more urgent? 
Does the country lack the domestic expertise, bureaucracy, and infrastructure – in short, 
lack the state capacity – to devise an adaptation strategy with a capacity-building focus? 
Tanzania is situated on the eastern coast of Africa. Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique border 
Tanzania on the north, west, and south.125 The Indian Ocean lies to the east. Tanzania’s 
varied geography consists of coastal areas, arid lands, semi-arid lands, plateaus, 
highlands, and alluvial plains.126 Well-known geographical features include Mount 
                                                 
125
 Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook: Tanzania 
126
 Tanzania NAPA, p. 6 
 43 
Kilimanjaro and Lake Victoria. Land is extremely important to the livelihoods of 
Tanzanians: agriculture accounts for over 40% of the GDP, comprises 85% of exports, 
and provides employment to 80% of Tanzania’s workforce.127 However, as a 
consequence of topography and climate, less than 5% of Tanzania’s land is arable.128 The 
country’s principal exports include gold, coffee, cashew nuts, manufactures, and cotton. 
Tanzania is a least-developed country (LDC), and its economic situation reflects its low 
level of development: the country’s per capita income level places it in the bottom 10% 
of the world’s economies.129 Over half of the population is below the national poverty 
line, with the clearest divide between urban and rural communities.130  
An overview of sub-Saharan Africa’s primary climate-related vulnerabilities 
according to the IPCC was presented in the introductory chapter of this study. Jouni 
Paavola probes deeper in his case study on Tanzania in Fairness in Adaptation to Climate 
Change. There is a disconnect between the scholarly perception of Tanzania’s most 
significant climate-related vulnerabilities (including human capital, access to technology, 
inequality, and the quality of institutions) and the conclusions drawn by Tanzania’s 
NAPA team (food, water, energy, industry, health, etc.). According to Paavola, the 
groups in Tanzania most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change are women, 
children, pastoralists, and the rural poor – and the NAPA should make a special effort to 
address these groups. Tanzania’s NAPA does mention the needs of the rural poor, and the 
NAPA team included rural farmers in the consultation process. However, the NAPA does 
not seem to give particular consideration to women or children.  
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Paavola believes that effective vulnerability reduction requires three distinct 
components. These components are significant, because they indicate a way in which 
Tanzania’s NAPA diverges from a more successful path to adaptation. The three 
components are: (1) Effective governance of environmental resources, such as forests or 
water, because it is important in order to ensure sustainability of livelihoods; (2) 
Institutional reforms and investments in infrastructure, because they help to improve 
market access and expand income generation in rural areas; (3) Public programs, 
spending on health, education, and social welfare, because they contribute to the maintain 
and enhancement of human capital.131 All three of these components are types of 
capacity-building. The absence of adaptive capacity also factors into a scholarly 
evaluation of a country’s vulnerability to the effects of climate change. In his study, 
Paavola considers social aspects such as class, gender, poverty, and sources of livelihood 
in addition to the physical status of the environment.132 Deficiencies in any of these 
aspects will set vulnerable groups at a disadvantage. Scholarly vulnerability reduction 
theories seem strongly linked to state capacity, in contrast to the adaptation measures 
proposed by Tanzania’s NAPA team, which focus on the physical impacts of climate 
change while ignoring societal factors. 
 Key sources of vulnerability pointed out by Paavola do not entirely match up with 
the vulnerabilities addressed in Tanzania’s NAPA. The scholar considers a broad array of 
factors, combining social science with the physical impacts of climate change. Tanzania’s 
NAPA team, on the other hand, seems to concentrate heavily on the physical aspects. 
This distinction could perhaps be a reflection of the limitations of Tanzania’s domestic 
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capacity – as a whole, the country may lack the capacity it needs in order to determine the 
kind of capacity it requires. Both physical and intangible human capital such as 
longevity, health, nutritional status, literacy, education, skills, and access to information 
are important in terms of adapting to climate change. Deficiencies in any of these aspects 
could negatively impact income, human development, and the capacity to act (for 
example, to respond to climate change). A lack of effective technology in transport, 
telecommunication networks, public utilities, and agricultural inputs shrinks incomes, 
hinders both specialization and diversification of livelihoods, and constrains human 
development. Levels and sources of income are vulnerable to climate change, and 
growing income inequality disproportionately harms vulnerable groups, reduces social 
cohesion, and thus diminishes a society’s ability to cooperate. Social capital can be 
another factor influencing vulnerability to climate change, since a lack of social capital 
reduces the capacity and quality of the institutions responsible for devising and 
implementing adaptation strategies.133  
 There is a distinction between impacts of climate change and vulnerabilities to 
climate change. Impacts are the physical effects of climate change, whereas 
vulnerabilities refer to the human implications of climate change’s impacts. NAPAs 
theoretically are intended to address both aspects, with the overall goal of reducing 
vulnerability, but Tanzania’s NAPA seems to concentrate heavily on the impacts rather 
than the vulnerabilities. It is also important to take into consideration how both the 
vulnerabilities and impacts are likely to change over time; Tanzania’s NAPA does 
manage to acknowledge both present and future effects of climate change. The current 
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and future situations of both climate change impacts and Tanzania’s climate-related 
vulnerabilities are presented in the following tables:  
 
Summary of Predicted Climate Change Impacts on Tanzania:134 
Climate impacts Current situation Future situation 
Food production Climate variability has a 
significant impact on food 
production and security 
Staple crop yields will 
decrease and food production 
risks increase 
Forests and land cover Substantial stocks of forest 
resources, but land use 
changes and harvesting 
levels cause deforestation 
Land cover changes, fires 
and coping with droughts 
accelerate deforestation 
Water resources Periodic droughts and 
flooding 
Periodic droughts and 
flooding become more 
frequent 
Deforestation increases 
seasonal flooding and water 
scarcity 
Human settlements Low-lying settlements 
affected by floods 
Floods will cause property 
damage more frequently 
Human health Water and insect-borne 
diseases cause significant 
mortality and morbidity 
The spread and incidence of 
water and insect borne 
diseases increases 
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Summary of Current and Future Vulnerabilities of Tanzania to Climate Change:135 
Vulnerabilities Current Future 
Human capital Health and educational 
outcomes are poor and 
deteriorating. Rural 
outcomes are worse than 
urban ones 
Future deterioration in health 
and educational outcomes is 
possible and an urban-rural 
divide is likely to persist 
Access to technologies Weak communications, 
transport and utility 
infrastructure 
Infrastructure will improve 
and provide better access 
especially in urban areas 
Income levels and risks Subsistence agriculture the 
most important and 
environmentally risky source 
of livelihoods and income 
Subsistence farming remains 
important but is increasingly 
complemented with market 
participation and its risks 
Inequality Urban-rural divide important 
manifestation of inequality 
both in terms of income and 
human development 
Inequality is likely to 
increase both in terms of 
incomes and human 
development 
Social capital and the quality 
of institutions 
Capacity for collective action 
present but institutions lack 
quality and the state suffers 
from lack of capacity 
Considerable uncertainty 
regarding the stability and 
strength of civil society as 
well as state capacity 
 
Tanzania’s NAPA 
In its NAPA, Tanzania lists what it perceives to be its own most pressing 
vulnerabilities to the impacts of climate change. Food production and access to water are 
vulnerable to drought. A severe drought could cause food shortages, food insecurity, 
water scarcity, hunger, and power shortages. The economy, particularly agriculture, 
energy, and forestry, is vulnerable to changes in rainfall – different from drought, since 
rainfall is predicted to decrease in some parts of the country but increase in others. The 
agricultural sector is extremely vulnerable, because increased temperatures, altered 
rainfall, climatic variability, erosion, and environmental degradation all affect crop 
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production.136 Tanzania cites its top four climate-related hazards as epidemics, drought, 
plant diseases/pests/vermin, and floods.  
Interestingly, Tanzania incorporates the responses of the stakeholders consulted 
by the NAPA team in its vulnerability assessment. Nearly half of those surveyed 
attributed the outbreak of epidemics to prolonged rainfall or drought, 30% to climatic 
variability, 41% simply to human health, and 10% to poverty. An overwhelming majority 
thought that drought was a problem because of prolonged periods of low rainfall, 60% 
because of the effects of the variability of rainfall onset on crops, and 53% because of 
increased desertification. Thirty-one percent of the stakeholders who believed pests to be 
a significant problem thought that climate change was the main problem (prolonged 
rainfall/dryness) and 14% blamed poverty. Eighty-three percent of stakeholders attributed 
floods to prolonged rainfall, and 19% to climate change.137 Perhaps the natural science 
focus of the country’s NAPA team results from the physical environment leanings of the 
participating stakeholders.  
NAPA Content and Adequacy 
Tanzania appears to have adhered fairly well to the NAPA structure put forth by 
the UNFCCC. The document begins with an introduction containing country-specific 
background information, then follows by presenting an overview of the adverse impacts 
of climate change both experienced in the present and predicted for the future. The 
NAPA also includes links to existing national development plans, vital adaptation needs 
(expressed in a section on vulnerability to climate change and sectoral analyses), criteria 
for selecting adaptation priority activities, profiles of the proposed activities, and barriers 
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to implementation.138 At the surface level, no NAPA component seems to be missing 
from the document.  
The main goals of Tanzania’s NAPA vary from immediate action to long-term, 
from community-based actions to national policy, from improving natural resource use to 
educating the public. The goals are listed as followed: (1) identify and develop immediate 
and urgent NAPA activities in order to adapt to climate change and climate variability; 
(2) protect life and livelihoods of people, infrastructure, biodiversity and environment; 
(3) mainstream adaptation activities into national and sectoral development policies and 
strategies, development goals, visions, and objectives; (4) increase public awareness (in 
communities, civil society, and government officials) to the impacts of climate change 
and adaptation strategies; (5) assist communities to improve and sustain human and 
technological capacity for environmentally friendly natural resource use; (6) complement 
national and community development activities hampered by adverse effects of climate 
change; and (7) create long-term sustainable livelihoods and development activities at 
both the community and national levels in light of changing climatic conditions.139  
The NAPA is intended to address a country’s immediate adaptation needs, which 
stem from the country’s primary climate-related vulnerabilities. Tanzania ranks what it 
perceives to be its most vulnerable sectors in terms of the negative affects of climate 
change. These sectors include agriculture and food security, water, energy, forestry, 
health, wildlife, tourism, industry, coastal and marine resources, human settlements, and 
wetlands.140 The NAPA then presents a ranking of project activities within each sector. 
For agriculture and food security, including livestock, the project activities were as 
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follows (in order of highest to lowest priority): increasing irrigation to boost maize 
production; implementing alternative farming systems; making better use of climate and 
weather data and other management tools; creating awareness of the negative effects of 
climate change; increasing the use of manure as fertilizer; developing range management 
for livestock production; changing land use patterns; implementing dip irrigation; 
controlling pests, weeds, diseases; implementing biological control of the tsetse fly; and 
promoting indigenous knowledge.141 For this sector, technical fixes were the most highly 
prioritized adaptation activities. Less tangible measures, such as awareness and 
indigenous knowledge, were ranked lower.  
Project activities for the water sector were: the development of alternative water 
storage programs and technology for communities; promoting water harvesting and 
storage facilities; developing reservoirs; implementing community based catchments 
conservation and management; employing new water serving technologies in irrigation; 
installing early warning systems for droughts and floods; and developing recycle and 
reuse facilities in the industrial sector.142 Again, the NAPA focuses on the “tech fixes” 
and does not consider adaptation strategies that address the country’s institutional/societal 
situation.  
The activities listed in the energy sector and forestry sector also fail to go beyond 
the technical/physical level. In the energy sector, prioritized activities included: exploring 
and investing in alternative clean energy sources; the use of community based mini-
hydropower; improving the efficiency of using biomass for energy; geo-thermal power 
generation; harnessing proven coal reserves; the promotion of cogeneration in the 
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industry sector; and enhancing natural gas utilization.143 Some of these proposed 
solutions, such as coal and natural gas, are not environmentally sustainable. Forestry 
activities consisted of afforestation programs in degraded lands using adaptive and fast-
growing trees; community forest fire prevention programs; strengthening community-
based forest management practices; the promotion of alternative sources of energy for 
domestic and industrial uses; promoting efficient technologies to reduce the use of wood; 
and enhancing the development of buffer zones and wildlife migratory routes.144 
Priority activities for the health sector involved the establishment or strengthening 
of community awareness programs on preventable major health hazards; ensuring the 
availability of sufficient trained staff at health facilities; strengthening malaria control 
programs; implementing early warning systems and emergency measures; establishing 
health and climate collaboration; employing efficient and coordinated early warning 
systems in all districts; and utilizing efficient communication equipment to assist early 
diagnoses.145 
Adaptation activities relating to the wildlife sector included providing assistance 
to rural communities in managing wildlife resources; supporting the implementation of 
community based management programs; combating illegal hunting and forest fires; 
creating a wildlife information database; protecting migratory corridors and buffer zones; 
developing and implementing management plans for protected/conserved areas; and 
improving wildlife/ecological surveillance systems.146  
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In the tourism sector, activities consisted of establishing alternative source of 
income for community in tourist area; developing a community based fire protection and 
control program; creating and protecting buffer zones around national parks and game 
reserves; sustainable tourism activities; and the relocation of people residing in wildlife 
corridors.147  
For the industrial sector, Tanzania’s NAPA proposes improving energy efficiency 
in industrial energy consumption; improving the efficiency of raw materials use; 
developing alternative uses of raw materials; water harvesting and recycling; installing or 
improving permanent drainage systems; and the implementation of renewable energy 
sources.148  
Adaptation activities recommended for coastal and marine resources were the 
construction of artificial structures for beaches; restoring degraded habitats; the reduction 
or elimination of non-climate stresses (ex. elimination of over-fishing, pollution 
reduction); relocation of small island communities as a result of sea-level rise; 
establishing protected areas; and desalinization of seawater.149  
Priority adaptation plans for human settlements included implementing a new 
land tenure system; relocating vulnerable communities; devising a database for hazard-
prone areas; sensitizing communities to climate change related hazards; a rural area 
improvement plan; a framework for dealing with disasters; improved zoning planning; 
and improved building codes.150  
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Finally, adaptation activities for the wetlands sector consisted of an inventory of 
wetland ecosystem types, an inventory of the spatial distribution of wetland ecosystems; 
wetlands monitoring programs; establishing Ramsar sites for sustainable management; 
and generating adequate capacity-building, awareness, and education on wetland 
management issues related to climate change.151 The fact the only mention of capacity-
building occurs in the last priority of the last priority sector is significant because it 
indicates an awareness of the need for capacity on the part of Tanzania’s NAPA team. 
Therefore, perhaps capacity-building plans are not included in the final list of prioritized 
activities because Tanzania does not perceive capacity-building to be as urgent as the 
other activities.  
The end product of a NAPA is a prioritized list of feasible adaptation plans that 
respond to the country’s most urgent climate change vulnerabilities. The NAPA team 
selects priority adaptation activities according to a set of criteria. The UNFCCC lets the 
LDC determine the criteria it will use for the selection and prioritization of adaptation 
activities, but it does provide a number of suggestions. According to the UNFCCC, 
selection criteria should include considerations of the “level or degree of adverse effects 
of climate change; poverty reduction to enhance adaptive capacity; synergy with other 
multilateral environmental agreements; and cost-effectiveness” and should apply to a 
variety of sectors such as health, agriculture, water, infrastructure, land use management, 
and coastal zones.152 Tanzania’s criteria for ranking adaptation programs adhere 
faithfully to the UNFCCC’s recommendations. Additional criteria included in the NAPA, 
though not specifically stated by the UNFCCC, include the improvement of the 
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livelihood of rural communities; the effect of the adaptation plan on the most vulnerable 
groups within communities (specifically the rural poor); “locally-driven criteria”; and the 
overriding goal of responding to the immediate and urgent adaptation needs as argued by 
the stakeholders.153 As well as adhering to the UNFCCC’s suggestions, Tanzania’s 
criteria seem to be fair and just, with a focus on helping the most vulnerable groups.154  
Tanzania’s finalized, prioritized list of adaptation strategies is as follows: “(1) 
Water efficiency in irrigation for crop production (to boost yield and to conserve water); 
(2) Development of alternative farming systems and water harvesting; (3) Development 
of alternative water storage programs and technology for communities; (4) Community 
based catchments conservation and management programs; (5) Exploration and 
investment in alternative clean energy sources (wind, solar, bio-diesel, etc.) to 
compensate for lost hydropower potential; (6) Promotion of cogeneration in industry 
sector to compensate for lost hydropower potential; (7) Afforestation programs in 
degraded lands, using more adaptive and fast growing tree species; (8) Development of  
community-based forest fire prevention programs; (9) Establishment and strengthening of 
community awareness programs on preventable major health hazards; (10) 
Implementation of sustainable tourism activities in coastal areas, and relocation of 
vulnerable communities from low-lying areas; (11) Enhancement of wildlife protection 
services and assistance to rural communities in managing wildlife resources; (12) Water 
harvesting and recycling; (13) Construction of artificial structures (ex. sea walls, putting 
sand on beaches, coastal drain beach management systems); and finally (14) 
Establishment of a land tenure system, and the promotion of sustainable human 
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settlements.”155 Overall, Tanzania’s adaptation priorities consist of tangible solutions 
with a focus on the physical environment, and do not include measures for increasing the 
state capacity that scholars such as Connolly, Keohane, Levy, and Haas believe to be 
important for effective adaptation. A number of Tanzania’s adaptation strategies require a 
certain amount of existing capacity for implementation, but none are designed to increase 
state capacity.  
NAPA Development Process 
Like the prioritization criteria, the process of developing the NAPA seems to be 
consistent with the UNFCCC’s recommendations. The country’s Vice President’s Office 
– Division of Environment created a National Climate Change Focal Point body, which 
was responsible for the formation of a NAPA team. The NAPA team consisted of 20 
experts from various sectors, including energy and industry, livestock, agriculture, forest, 
land use, wildlife and wetland, marine and freshwater resources, tourism, and health. The 
NAPA team was then divided into four groups. The groups consulted a range of 
stakeholders in different parts of the country, then compiled their findings and analyzed 
the impacts of climate change throughout the whole of Tanzania.  
Overall, the NAPA team conducted consultations in 13 districts and 52 villages, 
and developed a synthesis report “based on past and present studies, on climate change 
and coping strategies.”156 A public consultation, involving interviews and questionnaires 
administered to various stakeholders (government officials, private sectors, industries, 
communities) followed the synthesis report. According to the explanatory section in the 
NAPA document, Tanzania’s NAPA team had employed sound scientific research in its 
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assessment of climate vulnerability. The Minister of State, Vice President’s Office – 
Environment endorsed the final draft of the NAPA. Tanzania appears to have closely 
followed the NAPA development procedure proposed by the UNFCCC.  
The UNFCCC’s least-developed country expert group (LEG) played a significant 
role in shaping the NAPA development.157 The following principles were determined by 
the LEG: (1) The development of the NAPA should be a participatory process, including 
a sectoral participatory approach; a multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral NAPA team should 
be established; consultations should involve the participation of stakeholders from public 
sector and private sector organizations, including government ministries and departments, 
academic/research institutions, NGOs, the media; (2) The NAPA should follow a 
multidisciplinary approach, meaning that the NAPA team should include experts from 
both government institutions, such as ministries, universities, agencies, and private 
institutions/NGOs; (3) The NAPA should take on a complementary approach, in order to 
be compatible with existing national environment and development programs, such as 
poverty reduction, agricultural sector development, rural development, and the National 
Action Plan to Combat Desertification; (4) The NAPA should promote sustainable 
development; (5) NAPA development should be a country-driven process; (6) The NAPA 
should strive for cost-effectiveness; (7) The NAPA should aim for simplicity, so that the 
document can be easily understood by communities; and (8) The NAPA should be 
flexible, so that a range of actors (private sector, NGOs, individuals, and government 
institutions) will be able to implement NAPA activities.158  
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As mentioned previously, the NAPA was drafted after conducting a number of 
sectoral consultations. Farmers proved influential actors in the community sector, as they 
were able to share with the NAPA team their firsthand experience regarding the effects of 
climate change and their coping strategies. The farmers have been dealing with climate 
change by using both indigenous knowledge and modern science and technology.159 The 
NAPA team hoped that the participatory approach would ensure transparency and would 
increase the likelihood that “proposed activities are implemented and adopted by target 
vulnerable communities.”160  
Hypotheses and Analyses 
While the UNFCCC provides specific guidelines for the development and 
structure of the NAPA, individual LDCs are responsible for coming up with the content 
of their NAPAs. This country-driven approach is designed to ensure that the resulting 
adaptation plans address each LDC’s own climate vulnerabilities.161 One of the main 
ways in which the UNFCCC influences an LDC is by suggesting which types of 
adaptation priorities would be most appropriate. Therefore, while the content of 
Tanzania’s NAPA is country-specific, the type of content has been pre-determined by a 
large international body.  
 Tanzania states that its NAPA was influenced by the objectives of the country’s 
“National Development Vision 2025 for high and shared growth, quality livelihood, 
peace, stability and unity, good governance, high quality education and international 
competitiveness.”162 This declaration abides by the UNFCCC’s recommendation that the 
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NAPA relate to existing national development plans. Consistent with the goals of the 
National Development Vision, Tanzania’s NAPA also sets forth its own overall vision: 
“to identify immediate and urgent Climate Change Adaptation Actions that are robust 
enough to lead to long-term sustainable development in a changing climate,” and to 
“identify climate change adaptation activities that most effectively reduce the risks that a 
changing climate poses to sustainable development.”163 In order to realize this vision, the 
NAPA is designed to address the climate-related vulnerabilities of principal economic 
sectors and is intended to be “action oriented towards priority on the ground activities.”164  
At first glance, the contents of Tanzania’s NAPA seem perfectly matched to the 
UNFCCC’s recommendations and therefore sufficient for achieving the overall goal of 
reducing climate-related vulnerabilities and adaptating to climate change. However, a 
closer examination suggests that what Tanzania has come up with might not be enough in 
order to effectively adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. Do action-oriented, 
on-the-ground activities really lead to long-term sustainable development? What about 
increasing state capacity – a more passive means of adaptation, but viewed as essential by 
many scholars?  
I had initially hypothesized that the UNFCCC-designed process for creating 
NAPAs was too action-oriented to include relatively passive adaptation strategies such as 
capacity-building. This hypothesis seemed plausible given the content of Tanzania’s 
NAPA, but as it turns out, the UNFCCC does include the enhancement of capacity in its 
recommendations.165 The UNFCCC certainly encourages an action-oriented focus for the 
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NAPA, but it is not the fault of the UNFCCC that Tanzania’s NAPA does not include 
capacity-building plans. This initial hypothesis was not explored in the second two case 
studies.  
The next hypothesis suggests that African LDCs might be more concerned about 
responding to the immediate impacts of climate change, via adaptation strategies that 
vulnerable groups are able to implement, than about longer-term capacity-building 
strategies. Tanzania’s priority adaptation activities do address the vulnerabilities 
mentioned in the country’s NAPA; however, Tanzania’s NAPA does not incorporate all 
of the vulnerabilities presented by Paavola. While Paavola considers the big picture, 
including both social factors and the physical impacts of climate change, Tanzania’s 
NAPA team approaches the issue of climate vulnerability with a narrower focus. Given 
the country’s extensive consultative and participatory NAPA development process, it 
seems that the majority of Tanzanians believe that physical adaptation plans are higher 
priority than capacity-building. It is apparent that the NAPA team was aware of the need 
for capacity; capacity-building plans may have been out-ranked by the 14 adaptation 
plans that made it onto the NAPA’s final priority list. The hypothesis that the NAPA does 
not contain capacity-building as a result of the Tanzanians’ prioritization of urgent 
adaptation needs appears to be valid.  
Is it plausible that Tanzania does not include capacity-building plans in its NAPA 
because LDCs lack the capacity to design and implement such plans? The UNFCCC’s 
and the GEF’s country-driven approach, described in the introductory chapter of this 
study, suggests that the content of a NAPA should be left to the country itself. The 
reasoning is that a country’s NAPA will better reflect the needs of the LDC and will have 
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a higher chance of implementation if domestic stakeholders have an influential role in the 
development process. Tanzania acknowledges the fact that its under-developed condition 
might hinder the implementation of its adaptation strategies, but what about hindrances to 
the ability to even come up with certain types of adaptation plans? The Tanzanian NAPA 
team was aware of the challenges faced by the country in terms of carrying out the 
priority activities, and included a “barriers to implementation” section in the NAPA 
document. These barriers include limited internal capacity to fund adaptation activities; 
extreme poverty of most vulnerable groups; poor infrastructure, especially rural roads 
with limited access; limited credit opportunities for rural communities; the impact of 
HIV/AIDS; poor health conditions and resource-poor rural communities; and, 
significantly, the “limited analytical capability of local personnel to effectively analyze 
the threats and potential impacts of climate change, so as to develop viable adaptation 
solutions.”166  
 Tanzania’s difficult past, similar to that of many other African LDCs, helps 
explain the country’s barriers to implementing its NAPA. Numerous African countries 
have weak political systems and public administrations. Sometimes a weak state is the 
main explanation for a country’s underdevelopment.167 Tanzania has experienced periods 
of turmoil as pre-colonial, colonial, and post-independence regimes demolished 
“traditional authority structures.”168 Tanzania gained independence from the United 
Kingdom in 1964. The country inherited a certain degree of central public administration 
from the colonial period; in 1962, for example, local governments were formed under 
British guidance. However, these local authorities disrupted existing hierarchical 
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structures. In the late1960s and early 1970s, the young Tanzanian government created 
organized villages in order to facilitate the provision of water, transport, healthcare, and 
education. These new villages destroyed traditional ways of life. Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM), the ruling political party, exerted its influence by further dismantling the 
Tanzanians’ established authority structures. Authority conflicts occurred between the 
public administration and the party organization.169 Government corruption also occurred 
during the first several years of Tanzania’s independence, when heightened state control 
over the economy inadvertently gave public sector employees a dangerous amount of 
economic influence, until the 1967 Arusha Declaration prevented party involvement in 
economic activities.170  
 In its early days of independence, participation in politics was only possible 
through involvement with the CCM party. In 1992, the country transitioned to a 
multiparty political system. Nevertheless, Tanzania still faces numerous state-related 
problems. The country is considered only “partially free” in terms of rights and civil 
liberties scores.171 The opposition party, the Civic United Front, has experienced 
violence, and the Islamic Awareness Society has been responsible for small scale 
terrorism.172 In 2002, Tanzania achieved a score of 2.7 in Transparency International’s 
Perceived Corruption Index. A score of 0 means extremely high corruption, whereas 10 
signifies no corruption, so Tanzania’s score indicates that the country’s level of 
corruption is quite high. One possible explanation for the corruption occurring in 
Tanzania is that real earnings are decreasing, thus providing incentives for side income 
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and dishonesty.173 There have also been suspicious linkages between party organization 
and public administration, and incidents in which government members have misused 
their political power.174  
 However, corruption is not the biggest obstacle faced by Tanzanians. According 
to a survey conducted by the World Bank, inadequate infrastructure, the level and 
complexity of taxes, and export and import regulations constitute greater barriers to 
business than corruption.175 Barriers to business are significant, because Tanzania might 
not be able to achieve its development and adaptation goals without reaching some level 
of economic success. The Tanzanian state often has difficulty carrying out its tasks. 
Public administration frequently lacks the capacity to perform various duties, such as 
collecting local poll taxes.176 Problems with the public administration system are being 
addressed by a number of ongoing reforms, but the success of these programs has been 
doubtful. For example, public sector pay reforms led to increased salaries, yet the new 
salaries remain inadequate for subsistence.177  
 While the national government struggles, lower-level governments face 
challenges as well. Rural governments have the least capacity, since they lack many of 
the resources common to urban governments.178 Likewise, rural populations have the 
toughest time coping on a daily basis and also have a hard time making their voices 
heard. Vulnerable groups face obstacles to participation in consultations and to access to 
markets and public services, and often lack resources for articulating their concerns.179 As 
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mentioned earlier, women and children constitute particularly vulnerable rural groups. 
When compared to men’s daily activities, women’s tasks typically have much more to do 
with the land. Therefore, women are more affected by climate change, and have less time 
for non-climate-dependent activities that generate income. Children frequently drop out 
of school in order to take part in household chores or economic activities. Sometimes a 
child will go to work in a city and send money back home.180 This type of life could 
mean that a number of Tanzanians simply do not have the education necessary to develop 
the most appropriate strategies for adapting to the negative effects of climate change.  
In terms of education, social and institutional capacity, and science and 
technology, Tanzania fares better than Burkina Faso and Senegal, the other case studies 
in this report. According to the Human Development Index, Tanzania’s adult literacy rate 
is 69.4% – much higher than that of Burkina Faso or Senegal, but the fact remains that 
roughly 30% of Tanzanian adults cannot read.181 The Environmental Sustainability Index 
indicators show that Tanzania has relatively high female primary education completion 
rate when compared with other African LDCs. Tanzania also has a greater level social 
and institutional capacity than Burkina Faso or Senegal, a higher score for science and 
technology, and a higher level of eco-efficiency (especially hydropower and renewable 
energy production as percentage of total energy consumption).182 Regardless, it appears 
as though Tanzania may lack the government capacity and domestic expertise required to 
develop the most appropriate NAPA, including capacity-building adaptation activities. 
Tanzania’s poorly-functioning government is significant; the hypothesis that a country’s 
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NAPA lacks capacity-building plans as a result of the country’s weak domestic capacity 
is compelling.  
Conclusion 
 A close examination of Tanzania’s NAPA, including both the development 
process and the document’s content, a study of the country’s perceived vulnerabilities to 
climate change, and an investigation of Tanzania’s historical and governmental context 
leads to the conclusion that the country’s weak state capacity is the principal explanation 
for the NAPA’s lack of capacity-building plans. Vulnerable groups, particularly the rural 
poor, are particularly lacking in capacity; state capacity tends to be lower for local, small-
scale governments. Tanzania’s poorly-functioning government can be attributed in part to 
the legacy of colonization. My initial hypothesis, that the UNFCCC played a role in the 
omission of capacity-building in the NAPAs, did not turn out to be useful, because it does 
not appear that the UNFCCC’s guidance deters capacity-building.  
My second hypothesis, regarding the LDC’s own perceptions of vulnerability, 
does relate to the lack of capacity-building in Tanzania. The NAPA might not include 
capacity-building plans partially because Tanzanians do not consider capacity to be an 
urgent adaptation need, since the groups the most vulnerable to climate change are 
unlikely to be able to implement capacity-building plans. However, the third hypothesis 
holds the most weight. The colonial legacy has left Tanzania in a condition of disarray. 
The country lacks the capability to maintain a functioning economy and to reform public 
policy, thus impeding the ability to develop – never mind implement – comprehensive 
capacity-building plans. The state is unable to successfully reform its administration; it is 
no surprise that capacity-building has been overlooked or excluded. 
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IV. Burkina Faso 
 
Vulnerabilities to Climate Change in Burkina Faso 
Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in the center of sub-Saharan West Africa. 
Mali lies to the northwest of Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire to the southwest, Ghana and 
Togo directly to the south, Benin to the southeast, and Niger to the east.183 Burkina 
Faso’s geographic location renders the country especially vulnerable to the negative 
impacts of climate change and climatic variability.184 Currently, Burkina Faso has a 
population of 11,849,520. The majority of the population is young, and 51.1% of 
Burkinabés are female. Nearly 90% of the population is rural, and the country has a low 
population density with 43.2 inhabitants per square kilometer. Life expectancy is roughly 
53 years,185 and only 23.5% of Burkinabé adults are literate.186 The country’s low level of 
development intensifies its vulnerabilities to climate change. In this chapter, I investigate 
Burkina Faso’s perceptions of vulnerability and the country’s developmental situation, 
including colonial legacy, education, and economy, as explanations for why its NAPA 
does not include plans to build state capacity.  
Burkina Faso’s climate is tropical with sub-Saharan dominance, meaning that arid 
conditions prevail throughout most of the territory.187 The rainy season is short and the 
dry season long. There is some amount of climatic differentiation across the country: the 
Saharan zone in the north receives the least amount of precipitation, the northern sub-
Saharan zone in the center of the country receives slightly more rainfall, while the sub-
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Saharan zone in the south experiences a rainy season that lasts nearly half the year.188 The 
principal effects of climate change on Burkina Faso include drought, flooding, heat 
waves, dust storms, and an increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather 
events.189 The most vulnerable sectors and societal groups in Burkina Faso, according to 
the country’s NAPA, are strongly dependent on the state of the environment. Climate-
related disruptions in the water sector, agricultural sector, and forestry sector strongly 
affect rural populations, particularly small-scale growers, women, and children.190  
Like most other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Burkina Faso views a net 
reduction of water availability and a drastic drop in agricultural productivity as 
significant consequences of climate change. Water resources in Burkina Faso almost 
exclusively consist of tributaries and underground reservoirs fed by rainfall.191 Scientists 
state that it is the the variability of rainfall – not simply a decrease in net rainfall average 
– that causes most water-related challenges associated with climate change in West 
Africa. Rainfall unreliability and seasonality affects agriculture, economy, and 
livelihoods.192 Dry years and droughts are typically caused by the inter-annual variability 
of rainfall, rather than a low average level of rainfall. The distinction between drought 
and an arid climate is important. Aridity, the result of a low average rainfall, is an 
enduring feature of a region’s climate. Drought, “the temporary deficiency in rainfall 
significantly below the normal or expected amount in a year, season, or month,” is 
affected by rainfall variability.193  
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Rainfall variability occurs in different forms. Spatial variability is the difference 
in rainfall received between places, either structurally or proximately, within a given 
year. On the one hand, this type of variability can render mechanisms such as early 
warning systems less effective, since spatial variability is localized, and thus increases 
vulnerability to drought. On the other had, spatial rainfall variability does not necessarily 
compromise an entire region’s food supply, since there is a good chance that a 
neighboring village has escaped the drought.194 Inter-annual variability explains the 
difference in rainfall between years, the annual deviation from a longer-term average. 
This type of variability is not particularly noteworthy, unless the distribution of monthly 
rainfall is also taken into account (since changes in monthly distribution can greatly 
impact agriculture). Intra-annual variability has to do with the seasonal concentration of 
rainfall, the distribution of rainfall within a year. Intra-annual variability has especially 
significant implications for sub-Saharan West Africa, since yearly rainfall in this region 
is typically concentrated in one wet season (a “uni-modal” rainfall pattern). The duration 
of the rainy season increases as one moves from north to south in sub-Saharan West 
Africa.195 Farming activities take place predominantly in the wet season. Food often 
becomes scarce in the months leading up to the start of this season. Seasonality in the 
agricultural cycle, influenced by rainfall, affects nearly all aspects of life in countries 
such as Burkina Faso: food availability, food prices, prices of consumer goods and labor, 
labor demands, migration patterns, health, births, and deaths are all linked to seasons and 
rainfall patterns.196 Although intra-annual rainfall variability can lead to uncertainty and 
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agricultural problems, the seasonal concentration of rainfall is essential for crop 
production in many areas, since “an even distribution would mean that the monthly 
rainfall throughout the year would not be sufficient to sustain plant growth in any 
period.”197 
Ecologically, Burkina Faso’s territory is divided in two: the Sahelian region in the 
north, and the soudanien region in the south. Drylands comprise most of the northern 
region, while the larger southern region is marked by savannas and agro-forestry parks.198 
According to Burkina Faso’s NAPA, the over-exploitation of vegetal resources, a 
consequence of livestock and agriculture, is a human contribution to environmental 
degradation that should be addressed, because this type of degradation is augmented by 
the impacts of climate change.199 The country’s predominant crops include sorghum, 
corn, rice, and cotton. Ruminants and poultry are Burkina Faso’s most common fauna. 
Burinkabé soils are of poor quality,200 which makes agriculture particularly challenging.  
The Kaya Region 
A study on the Kaya Region illustrates the difficult conditions in Burkina Faso’s 
drylands. The Kaya Region is semi-arid, mostly rural, and has a relatively high 
population density.201 The city of Kaya is the only urban area in the region. The 
vegetation resembles a savannah, with thorn bushes in the north and dispersed trees in the 
south. Soils are sandy, have a low organic matter content, a low water retention capacity, 
and often undergo considerable amounts of degradation – in short, the soils are not 
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conducive to cultivation.202 For approximately 90% of households in the region, the main 
activities are crop cultivation and animal husbandry. Millet and sorghum are the primary 
crops, and cattle are the most common livestock. Trade and off-farm activities are not a 
significant contribution to income, but many households engage artisan activities such as 
weaving, cloth-dying, and pottery. Many of the region’s inhabitants are also bicycle 
repairmen, butchers, tanners, teachers. The region has practically no industry, and 
seasonal labor migration to the Côte d’Ivoire has become an important part of Kaya 
inhabitants’ livelihood.203  
The climate in northern Burkina Faso is hostile, even without the predicted 
negative effects of climate change. The dry season in the Kaya Region lasts roughly 8 
months. The 4-month rainy season starts in June. July and August are the most humid 
months in the Kaya, and the only months during which rainfall exceeds evapo-
transpiration.204 Total rainfall fluctuates considerably from one year to the next, and 
rainfall distribution varies throughout each season. 80% of rain “falls in high intensity 
showers,” meaning that the amount of water falling from the sky often exceeds the soil’s 
infiltration capacity. Runoff and erosion are common problems. Rain showers in the 
Kaya Region are localized; one village may receive a torrential downpour while a 
neighboring village experiences a prolonged dry spell.205  
A severe drought in the early 1970s prompted Burkinabés to wonder if a change 
of climate was occurring. A brutal drying trend spread through the entire Sahelian region 
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of Africa, and led to 100,000 deaths.206 Scientists across the world have since come to the 
consensus that anthropogenic climate change is, in fact, an ongoing situation that must be 
addressed. However, drought and environmental degradation in the Kaya Region cannot 
be solely attributed to a changing climate. The complex relationship between drought, 
climatic variability, and environmental degradation is affected by factors such as 
population growth, land use, and urbanization.207 Livestock grazing and cultivation of 
woodlands often leads to the degradation of vegetation, which in turn intensifies erosion 
and runoff. It is estimated that, under favorable conditions, 30 years is the minimum 
amount of time required for soils to recover their fertility;208 however, it would be 
impossible for inhabitants to stop using the land in the meantime, since agriculture and 
livestock are the basis for Burkinabé livelihood.  
Food production has been a constant challenge in the Kaya region. Food shortages 
and famine have been recurring problems since pre-colonial times. For example, the 
Zogoré hunger of the 1830s killed tens of thousands of people over the course of its 6-
year duration.209 In the 1970s drought, Burkinabés depended heavily on exterior food aid. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, rainfall strongly affected food production. Food security, on 
the other hand, was influenced by a variety of factors, including yield, food reserves from 
previous years, possibilities of food imports and aid, prices and availability of food in 
markets, and the population’s purchasing power.210  
The food production system in Burkina Faso has evolved over the decades. 
Agriculture used to be an activity for large social groups. The kin group (yiiri) grew crops 
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on a collective field (puugasenga). The monetization of local economies during the 
colonial regime eventually led to the “individualization” of agriculture, and food 
production became less of a community effort.211 The quality of agricultural techniques 
diminished, as did crop diversity, though cultivated areas extended into previously 
unexploited land.212 Furthermore, for reasons outside of human control, the agricultural 
season started later and became shorter,213 thus contributing to the worsening of the Kaya 
region’s food situation. Farmers attempted to rectify the state of affairs by using 
mechanized plows, cultivating vegetables, and growing rice in the lowlands, but these 
small-scale efforts had little effect.214  
Animal husbandry in the Kaya region has been considered the specialization of 
the FulBe ethnic group. The FulBe are particularly known for raising cattle. However, a 
different ethnic group, the Moose, hold political control over most of the territories, water 
resources, and soils. The Moose prefer cultivation to animal husbandry, and practice a 
different style of livestock rearing than the FulBe. The Moose’s strict control of the land 
limits the mobility of FulBe herdsmen, impoverishing the ethnic minority. The “extensive 
use of pastures [for livestock grazing] is considered impossible to reconcile with the 
extension of cultivated areas.”215 Tensions between farmers and herders are common in 
other African LDCs as well.  
Seno, Soum, Oudalan Provinces 
Historically, the provinces of Seno, Soum, and Oudalan in northeastern Burkina 
Faso have been known for their livestock production. This region of Burkina Faso differs 
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from the Kaya in that it is less arid, has fairly low levels of land degradation, and a low 
population density. Seno, Soum, and Oudalan have longtime been home to transhumant 
livestock producers, mostly the FulBe ethnic group. However, in the drought of the 1970s 
and 1980s, a number of FulBe, Tamachek, and Mossi immigrated to this more arable 
region;216 the diversity of ethnicities and languages is still evident. The new populations 
grew millet instead of raising cattle. Although livestock is still important in this region, it 
is no longer the principal occupation for most households. Interestingly, households shift 
their livelihood strategy depending on precipitation. Though cultivation is the dominant 
occupation, livestock becomes a more important source of income and sustenance during 
periods of low precipitation.217 Too much rather than too little water has been the 
predominant problem in this northern region as of late; in wet years, the area has seen 
increasing damage caused by flooding.218  
Over the past several decades, the Seno/Soum/Oudalan region has experienced 
urbanization and a growing market economy. The extraction of mineral resources, such 
as manganese, iron, calcite, and gold, has led to the development of infrastructure. A 
network of roads connects the region to bigger markets; the markets in turn lead to new 
technology that increases extraction efficiency.219 However, the quality and reach of 
infrastructure remains limited. Better infrastructure would facilitate economic 
development, which would in turn provide more resources for climate change adaptation.  
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NAPA Content 
 The content of Burkina Faso’s NAPA reflects the recommendations of the 
UNFCCC. The report is straightforward and begins with a table of contents, followed by 
a summary and then an introduction. The introduction includes a definition of 
vulnerability: the susceptibility of a natural or human system to be affected by the 
negative effects of climate change, climatic variability, and climatic extremes.220 Burkina 
Faso’s NAPA team also defines adaptation: all adjustment in natural systems or human 
activities in response to current or predicted impacts of climate change, including 
anticipative and reactionary adjustments.221 After declaring that the NAPA was 
developed according to a participative process that implicated various actors (decision-
makers, experts, technicians, agricultural producers, communities, etc.), the NAPA 
document states its objective: to identify priority actions based on the urgent and 
immediate adaptation needs of vulnerable populations.222  
The NAPA then provides an overview of Burkina Faso’s environmental 
resources, economic context, NAPA methodology, and current climate situation. 
Consistent with the UNFCCC’s proposed structure, Burkina Faso links its NAPA to its 
existing national development strategies. Overlapping goals include research on self-
sufficiency and food security; protection of the environment in terms of natural resource 
sustainability; increased revenues for the population; and improved management of water 
resources.223 Burkina Faso explains how its approach to NAPA formulation is 
multidisciplinary (the expert group was comprised of people with various specialties, 
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which ensures the representation of diverse sectors and activities), participative (regional 
studies played a role in the NAPA preparation process), complementary (the NAPA 
reflects existing policies, plans, and programs), profitable (aware of the costs of 
implementation and the expected impacts on vulnerable sectors and groups), and 
straightforward (effective and comprehensible for a variety of actors).224 Furthermore, the 
NAPA strives to take into account the needs of different societal groups, including men, 
women, children, the elderly, and farmers.  
What Burkina Faso perceives as its potential barriers to NAPA implementation 
are particularly interesting, because they differ from the other two case study countries. 
Burkina Faso cites its obstacles as a low degree of effective participation, the slowness of 
administrative procedures, insufficient financing, and social instability.225 Another aspect 
that makes Burkina Faso’s NAPA unique is the inclusion of a section acknowledging 
both traditional coping strategies and current adaptation practices. These practices deal 
with the water sector (the obtainment of potable water, pastoral and agricultural 
hydrology, and general flora and fauna needs), the agricultural sector (growing 
techniques, crop diversification, and the harvesting system), and the forestry and 
biodiversity sector (addressing forestry, fauna, fishing, and energy, since, like other 
African countries, Burkina Faso obtains a great deal of its energy from biomass).226 One 
example of the difference between traditional versus current adaptation strategies 
involves the forestry sector: an indigenous coping strategy is practicing selective cutting 
of woods, while a current adaptation practice is reforestation using local plant species.227  
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An important section in the NAPA is the explanation of the selection of priority 
activities. Burkina Faso’s NAPA team states that the most negative effects of climate 
change are rainfall variability, temperature rise, violent winds, and air pollution. The 
most vulnerable activity sectors are water resources, agriculture, and forestry and 
biodiversity, because they all depend directly on rainfall and temperature.228 Poor rural 
populations are the most vulnerable groups. Pre-selection and selection criteria were 
developed in light these climate change impacts and vulnerabilities. The pre-selection 
criteria for priority activities include the degree of vulnerability of involved sectors and 
social groups; the link between climate variability and climate change; and local 
capacities for implementing adaptation activities. This last criterion is significant, as it 
may suggest that possible adaptation activities were cut from the final list because of the 
low level of local capacity. The criteria used for evaluating adaptation activities that 
passed the pre-selection round include the reduction of the gravity of the negative effects 
of climate change/reduction of the risk of vulnerability; poverty reduction; synergy with 
other multilateral environmental agreements; and a cost/benefit analysis.229 For each 
proposed adaptation activity, each expert on the NAPA team assigned a mark from 0-3 
regarding each criterion. 0 corresponds with no impact, 1 implies weak impact, 2 
signifies average impact, and 3 stands for strong impact. The urgent priority actions 
determined by Burkina Faso’s NAPA team are as follows, in order of highest to lowest 
priority: famine early warning system; promotion of complementary irrigation; water 
management; feed production; natural resource conservation; fight against desertification; 
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optimization of irrigation; securitization of pastoral zones; promotion of CES/DRS; fauna 
habitat management; and promotion of renewable energy, particularly in households.230  
The NAPA team then elaborates on the urgent priority actions, and lays out a list 
of corresponding priority projects accompanied by the estimated cost for each project in 
US dollars. The first project on the list is the reducing climate change vulnerability by 
improving food crisis prevention, followed by the promotion of complementary irrigation 
in order to secure grain production; management of the mare d’Oursi (a large body of 
water); feed production and reserve feed stocks for cattle in the Burkinabé Sahel; the 
management of natural resources and certification of non-woody forest products in the 
eastern region of Burkina Faso; fight against desertification in certain areas; the 
development of irrigated corps in certain provinces; the securitization of pastoral zones in 
the Sahel and eastern regions; securing agricultural production by the implementation of 
various technologies; the promotion of fauna and habitat management; the 
implementation of protection perimeters and the fight against the pollution of surface 
water and groundwater; and the promotion of energy efficient equipment and renewable 
energy technology (cookers, water heaters, solar dryers, etc.). This last adaptation activity 
relates to the ESI “social and institutional capacity” indicator, 231  and happens to be the 
lowest ranking priority activity as well as the most expensive project on list.  
Annexes at the end of the NAPA document explain the priority projects in greater 
detail. Each project includes a title, justification, description (specific objectives, 
activities), means of implementation, short term results, potential long term effects, and 
implementation logistics (institutional arrangements, risks and obstacles, monitoring and 
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evaluation, and financial resources).232 Project 12 provides a clear example: The title is 
Promotion des équipements à économie d’énergie (foyers améliorés) et des technologies 
à énergies renouvelables (auto-cuiseur, chaffe-eau et séchoirs solaires, etc.), the 
promotion of energy efficient equipment (improved households) and renewable energy 
technology (auto-cooker, water heater and solar dryers, etc.). The project’s justification is 
the need to address Burkina Faso’s current dependence on biomass for energy; over 90% 
of the country’s energy needs are covered by traditional combustibles, mostly charcoal.233 
This is a problem in part because of the rapid rate of urbanization; city-dwellers have 
restricted access to biomass.  
The project description is divided into objectives and activities, and contributions. 
The objective is energy efficiency and renewable energy technology. Activities include 
supporting research on renewable energies; teaching women techniques for using energy 
efficient equipment; sensitizing and teaching artisans techniques for energy efficiency; 
facilitating the installation of energy efficient equipment in households; and subsidizing 
technology and equipment for efficient/renewable energy such as water heaters and 
cookers. Short term contributions of this project are lower utility expenses, reduced 
carbon dioxide emissions, and reduced time and effort for collecting biomass. 
Contributions over the longer term are preserved vegetal cover, and improvement and 
growth of biodiversity. In terms of implementation, the Ministère de l’Environnement et 
du Cadre de Vie was named as the head of the project. Regional directives, women’s 
associations, development project committees and NGOs are also expected to participate 
in the implementation of the project. Arrangements for evaluation and monitoring 
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conform to the regulations for the management of similar projects. Finally, the estimated 
total cost of the project was 1,230,000 US dollars. An accompanying chart illustrates the 
expected yearly cost of each of the project’s four main activities.234  
NAPA Development Process 
 The methodology employed for the NAPA development started with the selection 
of sites for the vulnerability and adaptation study. Ten locations were initially selected, as 
representatives of vulnerability to climate change in each of the country’s three agro-
climatic zones. Socio-economic criteria were used as an indication of poverty in each of 
the representative zones, presumably with the idea that there is a correlation between 
poverty and vulnerability. Finally, a report was produced, and the evaluation of Burkina 
Faso’s vulnerabilities and capacities to adapt became the foundation for the NAPA 
document. The report was validated at the regional and governmental levels.235  
Burkina Faso’s NAPA team refers to the country’s NAPA development process 
as participative and iterative. A wide range of actors were implicated, from state 
authorities to local communities. At the governmental level, an inter-ministerial 
committee was formed in order to implement the UNFCCC, which Burkina Faso ratified 
in September of 2003.236 Before the start of the NAPA process, the Conseil National pour 
l’Environnement et le Développement Durable (CONEDD) was established by the 
Burkinabé government in order to ensure that the country’s development actions would 
preserve the environment and incorporate a vision of sustainability. The Conseil National 
de Secours d’Urgence et de Réhabilitation (CONASUR) had already been set in place in 
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order to deal with calamities such as floods and famines, and to provide affected 
populations with immediate aid. 
The Secrétariat Permanent of the CONEDD was charged with the responsibility 
of supervising the entire NAPA development process.237 The preparation of the NAPA 
document was coordinated by the Ministère de l’Environnement et du Cadre de Vie, a 
branch of the CONEDD.238 The actors responsible for the development of the NAPA kept 
in mind existing international environmental agreements such as the Millennium 
Development Goals and the Kyoto Protocol, ratified by Burkina Faso in March of 
2005.239 A pilot committee for the development of the NAPA consisted of representatives 
of technical services, international and inter-African organizations such as the United 
Nations Development Program and Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la 
Secheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS), various socio-professional organizations, and civil 
society (including NGOs and other associations). The pilot committee decided on the 
methodology for the NAPA. The NAPA team, in charge of putting the NAPA together, 
also had a multi-disciplinary quality and consisted of experts from a range of fields. 
Workshops were organized in order to conduct the selection of experts for the NAPA 
team and then to facilitate the selection of study sites.  
 Participation at the regional and local levels was ensured through several different 
organizational strategies. The NAPA team conducted studies in five representative zones 
across the country. Each zone provided a sample of different types of administrative 
authorities, personnel responsible for decentralized technical services, NGOs and other 
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associations, and communities.240 Five regional workshops were organized for the 
identification of the sectors and groups that are particularly vulnerable to climate change. 
Furthermore, exchanges were organized between villages, to provide a range of 
communities with opportunities to recount their own perceptions of the impacts of 
climate change as well as the adaptation options that they identify as highest priority. 
Different societal groups were represented in the intra-village gatherings, including 
women, youth, the elderly, and farmers.241 After the conclusion of the regional studies, 
the pilot committee reviewed the NAPA team’s work and then passed the document 
along to the government.242 Burkina Faso officially adopted its climate change strategy in 
2006 during a counsel with government ministers. According to the NAPA document 
itself, transparency was maintained throughout all phases of the development process.243  
Colonial Legacy 
 Like Tanzania, Burkina Faso’s history includes a period of coercive colonial rule. 
The French colonial administration held control in Burkina Faso from 1897 to 1946. The 
French limited options for Burkinabés, often imposed military participation and labor, 
and demanded the production of cotton – a crop that would be useful for France, but that 
did little in terms of providing sustenance for the Africans. Agricultural policy under the 
colonial regime encouraged the expansion of commercial crops, sped up the clearing of 
new areas, contributed to land scarcity, and also uprooted individuals and broke up 
villages and compounds.244 Conflicts broke out during a dry decade, as people rushed for 
the lowlands. Eventually, peace and security improved in the regulated areas, but pockets 
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of no-man’s land had escaped the notice of the French. Many inhabitants hid in these 
unsupervised areas in order to escape the colonial rule.245 
 Post-World War II, Burkina Faso enjoyed both a freedom from the colonial 
administration and a period of relatively abundant rainfall. Young men began to migrate 
to the Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, in order to work in the cocoa industry and make money 
to bring home.246  Unfortunately, the decade of sufficient rainfall was succeeded by 
twenty years of recurring droughts. Again, inhabitants rushed to the more-arable 
lowlands, and violent conflicts broke out. Land-related tensions were intensified after the 
Revolution of 1983 and the land reform of 1984 turned all land in Burkina Faso into state 
property.247 The government regime of Thomas Sankara “condemned ‘traditional’ 
systems of land management as feudal and created a network of revolutionary defense 
committees (CDRs) in villages… which undermined the [local] authority regarding land 
issues.”248 
 A period of stabilization followed the twenty years of droughts. It became more 
common for women to accompany their husbands in their seasonal migrations to the Côte 
d’Ivoire. Cooperation between the Moose and the FulBe increased, and was manifested 
through cattle entrustments, gifts of milk and cereals, lending of money, and similar signs 
of trust. However, ethnic tensions began to resurface after 1997, between the Moose and 
the FulBe and also between the Moose that migrated and the populations in their 
destination areas. These renewed tensions can be attributed to pressure on natural 
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resources in addition to the confusion caused by democratization, decentralization, and 
privatization.249  
The economic situation in Burkina Faso exacerbates the country’s vulnerability to 
climate change. Burkina Faso’s economy is heavily dependent on the primary sector; 
agro-pastoral and forestry activities occupy 86% of the population and account for a 
significant percentage of the nation’s GDP.250 Unfavorable climatic conditions, including 
poor soils and insufficient rainfall, make primary sector activities a challenge. In addition 
to the climate-related stresses, Burkinabés struggle with technological and financial 
constraints. As a result, the country often has trouble ensuring food security.  
Analysis 
   The underlying reason for which the impacts of climate change are so 
problematic for sub-Saharan Africa has to do with the vulnerability of the populations. 
Natural hazards – flooding, drought, erosion, land degradation, and other effects of 
climate change – do not directly cause problems such as food shortages and other 
calamities. The effects of climate change and environmental degradation simply act as 
trigger events, and turn into disasters when they hit vulnerable people.251 The causes of 
vulnerability to climate change are often economic and political; many scholars believe 
that inequality is the major basis for vulnerability.252 Poverty and vulnerability are not 
synonymous, though there is a correlation between the two terms; poor people are often 
exposed to more risks than the wealthy. Exposure to risk is the external side of 
vulnerability, while the internal aspect consists of limited resilience and the inability to 
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cope.253 Therefore, if a country truly wants to tackle the root causes of vulnerability to the 
negative impacts of climate change, its NAPA should address the big picture. Rather than 
limit priority adaptation activities to “tech fixes,” countries should expand their focus to 
include social, political, and economic considerations – in short, state capacity. Why, 
then, have countries such as Burkina Faso neglected to do this?  
Like Tanzania, Burkina Faso’s NAPA lacks adaptation plans that are designed to 
build state capacity. It appears as though Burkina Faso faces the same challenge as 
Tanzania: ironically, it might not have the capacity to build capacity. The government is 
weak, unable to maintain stability and to ensure security, including food security, for its 
citizens, and the literacy and education levels are extremely low among Burkinabés. 
Burkina Faso’s NAPA team seems at least somewhat aware of this problem, as it cited 
lack of capacity as one of the potential barriers to NAPA implementation, and since 
capacity was one of the criteria for the selection of priority activities. The actors 
responsible for the development of the NAPA might have purposely selected adaptation 
programs that do not focus on capacity, because it was apparent that the capacity to 
implement such programs was missing at both the local and governmental levels. This 
desire to provide adaptation strategies that do not require a great deal of capacity for 
implementation relates to my hypothesis regarding the LDC’s own perception of 
vulnerability. The NAPA objective specifies adaptation plans that address the immediate 
needs of vulnerable populations. Women and farmers comprise some of the most 
vulnerable populations to climate change in Burkina Faso, and the aim of the NAPA team 
may have been to develop adaptation activities that are consistent with the existing 
capabilities of these vulnerable groups. Perhaps most capacity-building plans were cut 
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from the final prioritized list because of the low level of local capacity; vulnerable 
populations would have had difficulties in implementing capacity-building adaptation 
activities. The plan to improve energy efficiency in households, the only adaptation 
activity in the NAPA that directly relates to capacity-building,254 ranked last on the 
NAPA’s priority list and also was the most expensive adaptation activity.  
As was the case for Tanzania, it appears as though the most significant reason that 
Burkina Faso’s NAPA does not include capacity-building plans relates to the country’s 
low level of development and the government’s low level of capacity. Land turnovers, 
new agricultural policy, crop changes, and “individualization” that took place during the 
colonial period disrupted the traditional functioning of Burkinabé society. The post-
colonial Burkinabé government then mandated an additional change to land management 
practices. It appears that Burkina Faso has yet to recover from these adjustments, as 
Burkinabés continue to struggle with land degradation, land-related ethnic conflicts, and 
food security issues. A weak economy requires Burkinabés to depend on the land for a 
source of livelihood. The government’s low capacity to provide for Burkinabé citizens is 
reflected in the country’s poor infrastructure. Burkina Faso’s government is not likely to 
focus on capacity-building for climate change adaptation when it faces more pressing 
challenges, such as providing for the day-to-day needs of the population.   
Conclusion 
Burkina Faso’s geography and dependence on the land for livelihood greatly 
contribute to the country’s vulnerability to climate change. The study on the Kaya Region 
reveals some of the climate-related challenges associated with living in an arid region, 
including rainfall variability, soil degradation, drought, and famine. The Seno, Soum, and 
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Oudalan Provinces illustrate how climatic variability can lead to conflicts between 
farmers and herders, with resulting ethnic tensions. This region, in contrast to the Kaya, 
also experiences damage from flooding, showing that the impacts of climate change are 
varied even within a relatively small, landlocked country.  
The NAPA of Burkina Faso adheres to the UNFCCC’s guidelines, in terms of 
development process, structure, and content. The NAPA team did appear to pay 
particular attention to the adaptation needs of poor rural populations, the country’s most 
vulnerable groups. Most of the prioritized adaptation activities address agriculture and 
water issues. Interestingly, one criterion for the selection of priority activities 
concentrated on the capacity of local communities to implement the adaptation activities. 
This indicates that Burkina Faso wished to avoid adaptation plans that not everyone could 
implement, including the most vulnerable groups. Burkina Faso prioritizes adaptation 
strategies that poor rural populations are able to follow. Therefore, I suggest that one 
reason that capacity-building plans are excluded from the NAPA is that capacity-building 
is not perceived as one of the most urgent adaptation needs; the Burkinabés believe that 
they most urgently need adaptation plans that can be implemented by everyone.  
Another significant explanation for the lack of capacity-building adaptation plans 
has to do with Burkina Faso’s poorly-functioning government. Like Tanzania, the 
colonial regime left Burkina Faso in a state of disarray. It appears as though the country 
has yet to fully recover. The country is extremely underdeveloped, ranked 176th out of the 
177 countries evaluated by the Human Development Report,255 and the government 
struggles to provide its people with basic necessities such as peace and food. Therefore, 
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the Burkina Faso’s weak state capacity limits the country’s ability to implement capacity-
building plans as a part of its NAPA.  
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V. Senegal 
 
Overview of Senegal’s Vulnerabilities to Climate Change 
 Senegal is located on the western coast of Africa. Mauritania borders Senegal on 
the north, Mali on the east, and Guinea and Guinea-Bissau on the south.256 Similar to the 
previous two case study countries, Senegal is characterized by an arid climate, 
vulnerability to rainfall variation, and a heavy dependence on natural resources. The 
Senegalese realized the necessity of protecting the natural environment well before the 
start of the NAPA process. According to Senegal’s strategic framework for NAPA 
implementation, the NAPA has been designed to be compatible with existing national 
environment and development plans. Senegal had already devised plans to combat 
desertification, protect ecological zones, fight against invasive species, improve coastal 
management, mitigate global warming, and achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals.257 The NAPA aspires to complement these efforts, to conserve natural resources, 
and to work towards sustainable development. Although the scholarly theories on 
capacity-building suggest that capacity-building is an essential component to climate 
change adaptation, Senegal’s NAPA does not include capacity-building plans in its final 
prioritized list. I argue that the mention of capacity-building in Senegal’s NAPA reflects 
the country’s perceptions of most urgent adaptation activities as well as the country’s 
governmental situation.  
There are seven agro-ecological zones in Senegal: river, Niayes, northern 
groundnut basin, southern groundnut basin, sylvo-pastoral zone, Upper Casamance, and 
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Lower and Middle Casamance.258 The number of different zones suggests that Senegal’s 
geographical diversity is just as extensive as Tanzania’s. Population density in Senegal is 
somewhat higher than in Tanzania, with 48 people per square kilometer. The country is 
comprised of 10,165,314 inhabitants, and, as in Tanzania, the majority of the population 
is young; 58% of the population is under 20 years old.259 Over half of the population is 
educated, and nearly half is urban. Like many other African countries, Senegal 
experiences a great deal of poverty, especially in rural areas. Over 60% of the active 
population works as some type of farmer. This type of lifestyle is particularly vulnerable 
to the effects of climate change. 
Resources and livelihood in Senegal are greatly affected by climate, as in 
Tanzania and Burkina Faso. Senegal’s primary environmental resources include water, 
fish, wood, soil, and fauna. Climate change often results in rainfall variability and sea-
level rise, which can lead to the degradation of marine ecosystems and soil quality. In 
turn, damaged ecosystems and poor soils compromise the availability of most natural 
resources. Water resources, agriculture, and coastal zones are the sectors the most heavily 
impacted by climate change in Senegal.260 The activities that take place in these sectors 
involve roughly 70% of the Senegalese population and strongly contribute to the 
country’s GDP.261 Fishing and tourism, two other significant sectors in the Senegalese 
economy, are impacted by climate change as well.  
The majority of the Senegalese population depends heavily on natural resources 
for their livelihoods. Common activities consist of agriculture, fruit growing, market 
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gardening, livestock, poultry farming, fishing, seaport activities, and tourism.262 All of 
these activities depend on climatic conditions. The Senegalese the most vulnerable to 
climate change, therefore, are the people who partake in these activities.263 The category 
of most vulnerable groups also includes women, even though primary sector occupations 
are typically controlled by men. Women perform duties such as collecting water and 
wood; tasks that become increasingly difficult as the effects of climate change intensify. 
Climate change leads to a particular set of social, economic, and biophysical 
consequences in each vulnerable sector. A table from Senegal’s NAPA clearly presents 
these impacts: 
Table 11: Risk and Vulnerable Zones264 
 Social 
Consequence 
Economic 
Consequence 
Biophysical 
Consequence 
Coastal Zones Threats to 
populations and 
habitats 
Economic losses 
(essentially coastal 
industries) 
Coastal erosion, 
salinization, loss of 
biodiversity 
Agriculture Drops in 
agricultural yield, 
increasing food 
deficits (risk of food 
insecurity) 
Drop in revenues for 
the majority of the 
population 
Loss of agricultural 
land 
Water Resources Regression of water 
resources, problems 
of access 
Disturbances of 
hydroelectric 
programs 
Diminishment of 
water quality, loss 
of biodiversity 
Tourism Decline in GDP Direct and indirect 
loss of jobs 
Loss of beaches 
Fishing Disturbances in the 
exploitation of 
maritime resources 
Loss of revenue for 
15% of the 
population 
Loss of marine 
biodiversity 
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Prioritization of Activities 
Criteria for the selection and prioritization of adaptation activities take into 
account access to revenue, access to infrastructure, synergy with existing strategies and 
plans, and cost.265 The NAPA team considers access to revenue and infrastructure as 
indicators of poverty, which has become a significant factor in both the causes of 
environmental degradation and vulnerability to environmental degradation. Senegal’s 
NAPA classifies its priority adaptation plans by geographical zone, and ranks the plans 
according to the aforementioned criteria. For the Zone Sud, adaptation activities include: 
mangrove restoration (protecting, replanting); reforestation; utilizing crop varieties better 
able to adapt to the changing climatic conditions; and diffusing information.266 
Adaptation activities for the Zone Nord consist of reforestation, forest renewal and 
maintenance; micro-irrigation; restoration of soil fertility; utilization of adaptive plant 
species; management of water retention basins; and, again, the diffusion of 
information.267 Activities for the Bassin arachidier involve reforestation; the preservation 
of coastal zones; education; and hydro-agricultural management.268 Lastly, the activities 
for the Zone de Niayes include dune fixation; reforestation; the protection of vulnerable 
sites; information sharing; the promotion of water saving techniques; and the restoration 
of underground water reserves.269 The NAPA provides a detailed list of specific 
adaptation plans, including for each the context, description of activities, justification, 
objectives, cost of activities (with totals in Senegalese currency and U.S. dollars), and the 
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organizations responsible for the execution of the project.270 It is worth noting that, like 
the adaptation activities in Tanzania’s and Burkina Faso’s NAPAs, these adaptation plans 
do not address the need to build state capacity. Senegal’s adaptation strategies instead 
focus heavily on physical and technical fixes, such as improving irrigation and planting 
new crops.  
Vulnerabilities and Adaptation Activities by Sector  
As mentioned above, Senegal’s three most vulnerable sectors are water resources, 
agriculture, and coastal zones. The vulnerabilities within the water sector are similar to 
the water-related vulnerabilities described by Tanzania and Burkina Faso: rainfall 
variability, droughts, flooding, and damage to agriculture and livestock. Senegal’s NAPA 
team views its water problem in terms of development; for example, too much water is 
lost in the sea is a result of insufficient retention infrastructure. A great deal of rainwater 
reserves is lost as a consequence of ineffective water protection.271 Adaptation activities, 
therefore, should focus on the improvement of water infrastructure and should include the 
introduction of new water protection measures. Small-scale infrastructure, such as 
hillside returns and retention basins, could replenish the hydrographic system.272 The 
adaptation activities addressing the protection of available water reserves include: strict 
control of the use of chemical products such as pesticides; maintaining the equilibrium 
between the rate of extraction and the rate of water table renewal; improving the quality 
of water discharge; the treatment of water where pollution has been detected; the 
imposition of a sanitation plan on all habitation projects (graywater and blackwater 
currently are the primary sources of groundwater pollution, because many areas do not 
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have adequate sanitation); improved compliance with the rules for the protection of 
hydraulic openings, the establishment of protection perimeters for water capture zones; 
education, information sharing, and the formation of collectives.273 Though not included 
in this section of Senegal’s NAPA, biomass – Africa’s most common energy source – 
also affects water resources. As LDCs develop, energy demand will increase. Extensive 
use of biomass exacerbates soil erosion and flooding.274 Tanzania and Burkina Faso have 
developed adaptation strategies that are designed to implement alternative and renewable 
energy sources in households. Senegal does not include this type of adaptation strategy in 
its NAPA.  
Climate change is predicted to affect Senegal’s agricultural sector in many of the 
same ways that it will affect agriculture in Tanzania and Burkina Faso. Agriculture 
constitutes the principal source of food, work, and income for rural communities in 
Africa, and directly relates to hunger and poverty.275 Agricultural vulnerabilities are 
strongly linked to precipitation, since agriculture depends heavily on rainfall. 
Desertification and the long-term rainfall reduction have greatly damaged crops and 
vegetation in the northern two-thirds of the country.276 Furthermore, an additional 
consequence of climate change in Senegal is inter-annual rainfall variability.277 
Precipitation is becoming increasingly difficult to predict, and cultivation therefore 
becomes progressively more challenging.278  
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It is argued that, in terms of responding to climate change, Africa’s most urgent 
priority is to reverse the decline of agricultural yields.279 So far, agricultural 
intensification has occurred mainly through territorial expansion instead of improved 
agricultural techniques. Developing techniques for coping with irregular rainfall and 
improving agricultural product distribution (currently hampered by the low purchasing 
power of small-scale farmers) could increase food production without contributing to 
environmental degradation.280 In Senegal, technology and research form the basis of the 
NAPA’s adaptation strategies for the agricultural sector. Research-based adaptation 
options include the fight against desertification, the improvement of the efficiency of 
water usage in agriculture and industry, and the selection of plant species tolerant to 
adverse climate conditions.281 Technological adaptation strategies consist of the diffusion 
of agro-forestry techniques; the diversification of crops; the utilization of short-cycle crop 
varieties; the utilization of salt-tolerant crops; water collection and management; the 
extension of community woods; brush fire prevention programs; the dissemination of 
fertilization techniques; the reorganization of growing systems, the implementation of 
rural early warning systems; and an institutional push. This last technology-based 
adaptation strategy aims to boost the consideration of climate change science in the 
formation of policy decisions and to reinforce analytical capacities.282 Neither Burkina 
Faso nor Tanzania makes any direct reference to improving state capacity as part of an 
adaptation plan; Senegal’s inclusion of such a plan is significant.  
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Like Tanzania, part of Senegal’s geography is comprised of coastal areas that will 
be greatly impacted by climate change. One climate change scenario predicts a global 
mean sea level rise of 88 cm within this century.283 Most impacts of sea-level rise are 
likely to be indirect, such as changes in water supply, agricultural productivity, and 
human migration.284  Other indirect effects of sea-level rise are changes in erosion 
patterns; damage to coastal infrastructure; salinization of well-water; loss of coastal 
ecosystems and resources; and damage to the sewage systems of coastal cities, with 
adverse consequences for human health.285 According to the NAPA, vulnerabilities for 
Senegal’s coastal zones include floods, erosion, salinization of waters and soils, and 
mangrove degradation. Floods are a recurring phenomenon, and can be particularly 
problematic in urban areas.286 Coastal erosion also threatens urban developments.287 
Rates of retreating coastlines vary, but the average for sandy beaches is between 1 and 2 
meters per year.288 Many cities in Senegal are located along the coast. One study ranked 
Senegal 45th most vulnerable to sea-level rise out of 181 countries.289  
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Table 6: Principal physical impacts and consequences of climate change on coastal and  
marine zones290 
Principal physical impacts Expected consequences 
Sea-level rise Increase in coastal erosion 
Flooding of low coastal zones 
Salinization of water and soils 
Risk of mangrove disappearance 
Increase in wave heights Increase in coastal erosion 
Warming of ocean waters Changes in the structure and composition 
of marine species (fish and water birds) 
Development of toxic agents in marine 
animals 
Modification of upwellings Changes in the structure and composition 
of marine communities 
 
Senegal’s adaptation options for the coastal zone appear to be more sophisticated 
and comprehensive than Tanzania’s and Burkina Faso’s adaptation strategies. The NAPA 
includes technological options, natural resource options (the protection of certain 
ecosystems, such as mangroves), legal and institutional options, and capacity-based 
options.291 Burkina Faso’s and Tanzania’s NAPAs do not characterize adaptation actions 
as institutional or capacity-based. Senegal’s NAPA team acknowledged that technology-
based adaptation strategies are not always sufficient or appropriate. Legal and 
institutional options included a redefinition of the notion of public maritime domain; 
regulations concerning beach sands, permits, and environmental impact studies; and the 
formation of an institutional body to be in charge of the surveillance of coastal zones. The 
capacity-based options mentioned the need to strengthen the capacity of institutional 
actors (government ministries, decentralized structures, urban and rural communities), 
and the need for adequate information for decision-makers.292  
 
                                                 
290
 Senegal NAPA, p. 24 
291
 Senegal NAPA, p. 27 
292
 Senegal NAPA, p. 27 
 96 
NAPA Methodology 
 Senegal developed its NAPA in five phases and eight stages. The phases were: 
global organization, sectoral studies, public consultations, prioritization, and project 
formulation.293 The first two stages consisted of assembling the multidisciplinary NAPA 
team. The second two stages included a synthesis of impact studies, adaptation strategies, 
anterior consultations, and existing development frameworks; and a rapid participative 
evaluation of the current vulnerability and the potential intensification of climate-related 
risks. The fifth stage was a public consultation, with the goal of identifying potential 
adaptation activities. In stage six, priority criteria were developed in light of the outcome 
of the public consultation. The next stage a classification of adaptation activities and a 
demonstration of their integration with existing national development plans. The final 
stage included an elaboration of project profiles and, finally, the submission of the NAPA 
to the Senegalese government.294  
 In a sense, Senegal seems more conscious of its weaknesses concerning 
vulnerability assessment and adaptation than Tanzania. Senegal’s NAPA team included a 
section on limitations of the methodology in the NAPA document. The main limitation 
perceived by the NAPA team involved the organization of the public consultations and 
the prioritization of adaptation strategies. The NAPA team felt that the results of the 
public consultation were strongly tied to the feelings and knowledge of the people present 
– perhaps suggesting that the biased views of the consultation’s participants did not lead 
to the most accurate representation of the country’s climate situation. In terms of 
prioritizing adaptation plans, the NAPA team reflected that decisions were based on 
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people, subject to human limitations, rather than scientific models. The outcome of the 
prioritization decisions, then, depended on the preferences, experiences, and knowledge 
of the involved actors. The selection of priority activities was the result of achieving 
consensus, not optimization.295 
Analysis 
Overall, Senegal’s NAPA seems more advanced than the NAPAs of Tanzania and 
Burkina Faso. Senegal elected to organize its entire NAPA by sector, and then presented 
vulnerabilities and adaptation options within each sector. Senegal’s document includes 
more scientific data, graphs, charts, and tables. The Senegalese NAPA team recognizes 
the importance of institutions and capacities. The adaptation plans appear to be more 
comprehensive and detailed when compared to the NAPAs of Tanzania and Burkina 
Faso. While the Senegalese NAPA, like the others studied, does not include adaptation 
strategies that specifically focus on capacity-building, capacity is clearly taken into 
consideration by the NAPA team. Senegal’s NAPA team distinguishes between different 
types of capacity, states that technical capacity is not always sufficient, and recognizes 
the importance of institutions having the capacity to carry out their tasks.  
 Some scientists argue that African climate change strategies should take a 
“development first” approach.296 Low levels of development are often cited as barriers to 
effective adaptation to climate change impacts. Furthermore, it is perceived that climate 
change will hinder the achievement of many of the Millennium Development Goals. 
Proponents of the “development first” approach believe that future climate strategies 
should emphasize development plans with subsidiary climate benefits, and should work 
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to increase the country’s capacity to implement these plans.297 Development is 
particularly important in terms of capacity, since a country’s ability to increase its 
capacity to deal with the impacts of climate change strongly depends on the country’s 
overall ability to develop.298 The capability to develop refers to carrying out the general 
tasks of the nation state, including problem-solving, and setting and realizing 
objectives.299 Common barriers to development consist of inappropriate infrastructure, 
poorly-functioning markets, and weak institutions.300 The agricultural sector provides an 
example of the link between poor markets and underdevelopment: thanks to agricultural 
research, technologies exist to enhance agricultural production levels. However, farmers 
have not been able to implement these technologies due to a lack of markets and 
economic incentives.301  
 The market system may be one reason why LDCs lack comprehensive climate 
change strategies. Many African developing countries and LDCs are in the midst of an 
economic transition. The role of the state becomes less and less significant as countries 
liberalize state enterprises and open markets to international investments.302 
Consequently, governments are finding that their reach has diminished in an increasingly 
market-oriented context. As governments are obliged to focus their attention on a smaller 
number of priority issues, climate change often takes the back seat.303  
A “Development and Climate” project, involving Senegal and other West African 
countries, was started in 2002. The goals of this project focused on policies that 
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simultaneously meet development priorities and address climate change issues; long-term 
sustainable development; and integrated development and climate strategies.304 The 
NAPA teams of Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Senegal do attempt to demonstrate the 
NAPA’s compatibility with existing national development plans. Senegal’s NAPA 
addresses capacity more than the other two, and even proposes capacity-building plans as 
a response to climate-related vulnerabilities in the agricultural and coastal sectors. 
However, as I have demonstrated throughout this study, none of the three NAPAs contain 
priority adaptation strategies that include capacity-building plans. It is encouraging, 
though, that Senegal’s NAPA team has so clearly stated the need to increase capacity.  
Senegal is the site of an innovative project with encouraging implications for 
African agriculture. From the 1970s onward, sub-Saharan Africa has undergone severe 
droughts, a 30-40% reduction in rainfall, falling groundwater tables, and soil degradation. 
The Sebikotane region of Senegal experiences the added stress of strong coastal winds 
that blow away topsoil.305 A pilot farm in the Sebikotane has demonstrated that it is 
possible to “produce” a new environment that is more hospitable to agriculture. New 
agroforestry techniques on the pilot farm have become models for the reversal of 
desertification, the increase of agricultural production, and the subsequent increase of 
revenue. Trees are planted in dense perennial hedges, so that they serve as windbreaks. It 
is easier for crops to grow when they are planted in soils that are protected from the wind. 
The use of trees as windbreaks also provides a readily-available source of wood for 
cooking, and thus decreases the fuel-collection time and effort for women and girls. Drip 
irrigation replaces water-intensive and rain-fed agricultural practices. The pilot farm has 
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experienced a great deal of success. Farmers who have passed through the pilot farm 
have introduced many of the farm’s techniques in their own communities.306  
Long-term strategies such as the transition to sustainable farming are promoted by 
Moussa Seck of the Senegalese NGO Environnement et Developpement du Tiers-Monde 
(EDNA-TM). Seck asserts that it is essential to think in the long-term, and that the three- 
to five-year duration of most adaptation programs is insufficient.307 The time frame of 
projects is often a point of contention. The development and adaptation efforts of many 
LDCs tend to be focused on the short-term; long-term impacts of climate change are not 
priorities when people are concerned with their ability to sustain themselves on a day-to-
day basis.308  
As well as integration with development plans, a climate change response should 
give considerable attention to food production, water scarcity, wood demand, and 
electricity. Because of population growth, food production will need to double over the 
next quarter century; however, climate change decreases agricultural productivity. Within 
30 years, populations facing water scarcity will double, yet climate change decreases 
water availability. Wood demand is also expected to double in the foreseeable future, but 
climate change makes forest management increasingly difficult as a consequence of pests 
and fires. Finally, electricity demand in developing countries will increase three to five 
times over the next several decades.309 Since burning fossil fuel exacerbates climate 
change, clean energy alternatives will need to be developed and implemented.  
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A country’s government, typically the ministry of the environment or a 
meteorological services department, ultimately holds the responsibility for the 
development and implementation national climate change activities. A lack of state 
capacity, therefore, can significantly hinder the country’s ability to come up with an 
effective adaptation plan. The group in charge of developing the adaptation plan – in this 
case, the NAPA team – must conduct research, modeling, and analysis, and must 
coordinate between different government ministries.310 Often, government personnel 
struggle to find the time to participate in climate change studies. Furthermore, the multi-
disciplinary nature of climate change can mean that an adaptation study implicates 
several different government ministries, each with different perceptions and priorities. 
The need to cooperate across ministries makes it “difficult to collect data, perform 
analysis and build meaningful capacity across ministerial borders… The realities of 
government departments can inhibit the process of carrying out the study and building 
capacity among staff.”311 
Examination of Hypotheses 
Does Senegal’s NAPA truly reflect the country’s vulnerabilities to climate 
change? If the NAPA team did not identify the lack of capacity as a vulnerability, there 
would be no reason for the NAPA to include capacity-building strategies. I argue that the 
NAPA does adequately reflect Senegal’s climate-related vulnerabilities, as identified by 
both the NAPA team and other scholars. Senegal’s NAPA clearly recognizes the 
country’s need for capacity, and goes so far as to propose adaptation strategies with a 
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capacity-building focus for the agriculture and coastal zone sectors, even though these 
plans do not make it onto the final prioritized list.  
 Does Senegal have the capacity to develop capacity-building adaptation plans? 
Ironically, many LDCs lack the capacity to build capacity. Since their independence, 
Tanzania and Burkina Faso have struggled to maintain peace and order; it is likely that 
the governments of these countries are so preoccupied with the effort to perform basic 
duties that they are unable to build state capacity to address the impacts of climate 
change. As the case in Tanzania and Burkina Faso, none of Senegal’s final priority 
adaptation plans focus on capacity-building. However, Senegal’s NAPA does pay a 
remarkable amount of attention to the need for capacity, especially when compared with 
the other two countries. Also in contrast to Tanzania and Burkina Faso, Senegal’s 
transition to independence occurred unusually smoothly. I argue that the correlation 
between government stability and capacity helps to explain the absence of capacity-
building plans in the NAPAs of these LDCs; Senegal’s NAPA addresses capacity more 
than the other countries, and Senegal’s government has also been more stable.  
Tony Chafer argues that since its independence from the French colonial rule, 
“Senegal’s close ties to France have contributed to its political stability.”312 Senegal was 
among France’s oldest colonies, and has enjoyed a mutually profitable relationship with 
its former colonizer. Leopold Sédar Senghor, who became president when Senegal 
gained its independence in 1960, was a devout Francophile and ensured that his country 
had a smooth, successful start while maintaining cooperation with France. Senghor 
“earned a reputation as an enlightened African leader who bequeathed to his country 
stability, a relatively open society with a vigorous free press, and a functioning 
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democracy.”313 Senegal’s ongoing bond with France helped to ensure this stability. 
France’s military aided the Senegalese government in a time when nationalist groups 
showed signs of uprising. Additionally, the fact that Senegal continued to use the French 
franc as its currency encouraged French educators and government advisors to take posts 
in the former colony.314  
By the time Senegal’s third president came to power, the special rapport with 
France had begun to deteriorate. France experienced problems dealing with illegal 
Senegalese immigrants, and Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade worked to expand 
foreign relations to the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries in 
Africa.315 However, the close ties with France immediately following decolonization 
allowed Senegal to commence its independence with a stable economy, and a relatively 
peaceful population, and a remarkably well-functioning government.  
As a result of its historical/governmental situation, Senegal fares better than 
Tanzania and Burkina Faso in terms of having the capacity to develop capacity-building 
adaptation strategies. However, it is important to note that while capacity-building plans 
were initially proposed in Senegal’s NAPA, the plans did not make it to the final list of 
priority activities. This indicates that, while the Senegalese recognized their need for 
improved capacity, they viewed other types of adaptation strategies as more appropriate 
for the NAPA. Therefore, even though Senegal’s government appears to have more 
extant capacity than the other two governments, Senegal would still benefit from 
capacity-building.  
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According to the Environmental Sustainability Index, Senegal has higher levels of 
environmental health and environmental governance than Tanzania and Burkina Faso. 
However, in the broad category of social and institutional capacity, Tanzania fared 
slightly better than Senegal, though Senegal did achieve a higher score than Burkina 
Faso. Senegal’s score for the science and technology indicator is also somewhere 
between the scores for Tanzania and Burkina Faso.316 Clearly, none of the three countries 
excels in terms of environmental sustainability and climate change adaptation. Although 
Senegal has achieved better government stability than either Tanzania or Burkina Faso, it 
is still an LDC, and is ranked 156th out of the 177 countries investigated by the Human 
Development Report.317 Furthermore, Senegal’s adult literacy rate is only 39.3%318 
(hence the great number of proposed adaptation projects that include an 
educational/information-sharing component). The fact that Senegal’s HDR ranking and 
overall ESI scores are comparable to the other two countries suggests that, despite its 
better functioning government, Senegal still has a great deal of room for progress.  
Conclusion 
Overall, Senegal’s situation supports the hypotheses that the NAPAs of LDCs in 
sub-Saharan Africa do not include capacity-building plans because of the countries’ own 
perceptions of vulnerability and, more importantly, because of the low levels of existing 
state capacity. Unlike Tanzania and Burkina Faso, Senegal includes a significant amount 
of capacity-related information in its NAPA. Although capacity-building plans did not 
make it onto the final prioritized list of activities, it is apparent that Senegal’s NAPA 
team was fully aware of the need for capacity, as well as the distinction between 
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technology-based and capacity-based adaptation plans. The NAPA team was also 
cognizant of the country’s limitations in both developing and implementing its NAPA. 
This increased awareness of capacity, in comparison to the other two countries examined 
in this report, can be attributed to Senegal’s relatively higher development status. The 
Human Development Report ranked Senegal 20 countries higher than Burkina Faso, and 
3 countries higher than Tanzania.319 Furthermore, unlike the other countries, Senegal’s 
colonial experience and subsequent transition to independence resulted in stability and a 
well-functioning democracy. As a result, the Senegalese government has more capacity 
to provide for the basic needs of the Senegalese population, and the country is several 
steps closer to developing capacity-building for adaptation to climate change. Even 
though Senegal would still benefit from capacity-building activities as part of a response 
to climate change, the fact that Senegal at least explores capacity-building in its NAPA 
demonstrates that the country is closer to implementing capacity-building activities than 
the other two countries.  
I argue that, ultimately, the omission of capacity-building in the NAPA’s final list 
of priority activities can be attributed to Senegal’s perceptions of urgency and local 
feasibility. The NAPA team clearly demonstrates an awareness of capacity-building 
strategies, and the country appears to have a higher degree of existing capacity than either 
Burkina Faso or Tanzania. Therefore, it seems as though Senegal would be able to 
develop effective capacity-building strategies if need be, and has elected instead to put 
forth adaptation strategies that are more technology-based, designed for implementation 
directly by the groups the most vulnerable to climate change.  
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VI. Conclusion 
This thesis addressed the lack of capacity-building in the climate change 
adaptation plans of sub-Saharan African least-developed countries. My focus was on state 
capacity, the technical and intellectual capability of governments to develop and 
implement adaptation strategies. I opened the study with a background on the impacts of 
climate change on sub-Saharan Africa. I also presented an explanation of the National 
Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) rationale and development process, and an 
overview of theories on capacity-building. In order to ascertain why the NAPAs of 
African LDCs did not include prioritized adaptation activities that emphasized capacity-
building, I analyzed the climate-related vulnerabilities and NAPA content of three case 
study countries, investigated the countries’ current levels of state capacity, and sought 
explanations for my findings in the countries’ historical backgrounds. The Environmental 
Sustainability Index and the Human Development Report provided useful indicators of 
existing capacity, including science and technology, institutions, education and literacy 
rates, and economic situations.  
I have demonstrated that capacity-building adaptation plans are missing from the 
NAPAs of three least-developed countries in sub-Saharan Africa. I selected Tanzania, 
Burkina Faso, and Senegal as case studies because each has a slightly varied set of 
climate-related vulnerabilities and a different level of existing state capacity. According 
to the theories of Connolly, Keohane, Levy, and Haas, capacity is an important 
component of adaptation to climate change. Countries require state capacity in order to 
identify adaptation needs, to obtain and evaluate information necessary for the 
formulation of an adaptation strategy, and to develop and implement the strategy itself. 
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LDCs typically lack state capacity; oftentimes, governments barely have the capacity to 
perform the basic tasks expected of a nation-state. Most African LDCs have “not yet 
succeeded in bringing either stability or coherent development to the region.” 320 The fact 
that these countries experience a deficiency in state capacity, an element so valuable in 
terms of adaptation to climate change, led me to seek an explanation for why capacity-
building plans are not included in the NAPAs.  
My hypotheses addressed the question of why the NAPAs of African LDCs have 
generally failed to include capacity-building in their lists of prioritized adaptation 
activities. I argued that two major factors help to explain the lack of capacity-building 
plans in the NAPAs of sub-Saharan Africa. First of all, it could be that the countries 
simply – and ironically – lack the capacity to build capacity. Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and 
Senegal all recognized the value of capacity at some point in their NAPAs; yet, in all 
three NAPAs, the prioritized lists of adaptation activities do not lead to an increase in 
state capacity. The adaptation activities appear to be designed for implementation at all 
levels of society, including the groups the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change. The most vulnerable groups consist of poor, rural populations that, incidentally, 
have the least amount of capacity to implement adaptation programs. Since NAPAs are 
intended to respond to a country’s immediate and urgent adaptation needs, and since the 
NAPAs of Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Senegal demonstrated an awareness of the 
importance of capacity, it appears that the LDCs did not consider capacity-building to be 
as high a priority as other adaptation activities that the most vulnerable groups would be 
able to implement. The fact that rural groups in particular have such low levels of 
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capacity reflects the weak state capacity of the LDCs in general. This leads to my next 
hypothesis.  
In my second hypothesis, I argued that LDCs’ low levels of existing state capacity 
correspond in part to the countries’ colonial legacies. All three countries examined in this 
report are former European colonies. The United Kingdom controlled Tanzania until 
1964, Burkina Faso was a colony of France until 1946, and Senegal gained independence 
from the French colonial authorities in 1960. Since their independence, Tanzania and 
Burkina Faso have suffered from instability, corruption, and poorly-functioning 
governments – conditions that simultaneously contribute to and are exacerbated by 
environmental degradation. Tanzania and Burkina Faso do not explore capacity-building 
issues in any type of depth in their NAPAs, and both countries cite lack of capacity as a 
barrier to NAPA implementation. Senegal, on the other hand, experienced a remarkably 
smooth transition to independence, and managed to sustain close ties with France. The 
former colonizer helped the Senegalese government to ensure stability during threats of 
uprising, and also provided expertise in the form of teachers and military and technical 
advisors. This helps to explain why Senegal’s government has more existing state 
capacity than the governments of Tanzania and Burkina Faso. Senegal’s government is 
better able to provide for its population and to execute institutional reforms, and therefore 
better equipped to develop capacity-building adaptation plans. Senegal’s NAPA 
differentiates between the capacity to strengthen institutional actors and the capacity of 
decision-makers to procure and interpret relevant information, and includes proposals to 
increase these types of capacity.  
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 The absence of capacity-building plans in the NAPAs is significant; the UNFCCC 
intended the NAPAs to be the major mechanism for adaptation to climate change in 
LDCs, and if state capacity is necessary for effective adaptation, then additional 
adaptation procedures must be devised. Because a number of LDCs lack the capacity to 
build capacity, outside assistance may be required. Sub-Saharan Africa will be 
particularly affected by climate change, and LDCs in this region are especially vulnerable 
to climate change’s impacts. It is essential that all adaptation requirements of LDCs be 
addressed, as the world has committed itself to a changing climate well into the future.  
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